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ARTICLES

“There’s Danger Here, Cherie!”

1

LIABILITY FOR THE PROMOTION AND
MARKETING OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL
DEVICES FOR OFF-LABEL USES
Richard C. Ausness†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Physicians often prescribe prescription drugs and other
medications for uses that are not approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”), and such “off label” prescription
is widely accepted within the medical community as a legitimate form of treatment.2 However, the federal government
discourages off-label prescription and use in various ways. For
example, the FDA restricts the dissemination of information
by drug companies about potential off-label therapies.3 In
addition, federally funded health insurance programs such as
Medicaid do not reimburse health care providers for off-label
uses.4 Because drug companies make large profits from off-label
prescriptions, they are often tempted to illegally promote offlabel uses of their products or to encourage health care
providers to defraud the federal government by seeking reimbursement for off-label uses. This conduct is exceedingly risky
and has cost drug companies hundreds of millions of dollars in
†

Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1966, and J.D.,
1968, University of Florida; LL.M., 1973, Yale University.
1
Harry Caray, legendary sportscaster for the Chicago Cubs baseball club,
often exclaimed, “There’s danger here, Cherie,” when a home-run hitter for the
opposing team stepped up to the plate.
2
See infra text accompanying notes 9-16.
3
See infra Part II.B.
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(i)(10), 1396r-8(k)(3) (2000).
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fines and civil penalties. Moreover, the current federal policy
with respect to off-label use not only threatens the pocketbooks
of drug companies, but also adversely affects public health by
discouraging drug companies from publicizing promising offlabel therapies. A revision of the current policy is urgently
needed.
An off-label use is one that is not provided for on the
product’s FDA-approved labeling.5 A doctor makes an off-label
prescription when he or she prescribes a drug or medical device
to treat a medical condition other than the one the drug or
device was approved to treat.6 Off-label prescription also
involves using a different method of applying the treatment as
well as prescribing a drug or device to patient groups other
than those for whom the FDA approved it.7 In addition, offlabel use includes prescriptions for drug dosages that are
different from the recommended dosage or for periods that
exceed the recommended use in the labeling.8
Off-label uses are not necessarily unusual or experimental.9 In fact, they are widely accepted within the medical
community and may sometimes be the most effective treatment
for certain types of medical conditions.10 It is estimated that
between twenty and sixty percent of all prescriptions are for
off-label uses.11 For example, a large percentage of prescriptions
for pediatric use are off-label because many drugs are not
tested or approved for use by children.12 Off-label uses are also
common in cancer therapy and are often considered to be
among the most effective treatments.13 Off-label uses are even
5

Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 41, 43 (2005).
6
Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDAApproved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV.
181, 189 (1999).
7
Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug
Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 141 (1994).
8
Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination of Information on Off-Label Use Under the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 647 (1999).
9
James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 72 (1998).
10
See Martin Page, CBER Status on Reform Initiatives: Industry Reactions
and Comments, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 193, 195 (1997).
11
Michael I. Krauss, Essay, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification
Monopoly: Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV.
457, 472 (1996).
12
Salbu, supra note 6, at 193.
13
William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248-49 (1993).
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more prevalent in the treatment of AIDS, where between
ninety and one hundred percent of applications are thought to
be off-label.14
Courts have repeatedly held that certain off-label uses
are legitimate forms of therapy.15 The FDA has also tacitly
recognized that off-label uses are legitimate.16 Nevertheless,
the FDA severely restricts the ability of drug manufacturers
to promote off-label uses for their products.17 Thus, drug
companies are forced to circumvent, or even violate, the law if
they wish to inform physicians about beneficial off-label
therapies (and make money from the increased sales of their
products). The drug companies that cross the line and get
caught face substantial civil and criminal liability. This Article
concludes that the current FDA policy should be revised
because it encourages criminal behavior on the part of pharmaceutical companies and deprives physicians of potentially
useful information about new and useful treatments.
Part II examines the FDA’s drug and medical device
approval processes, as well as its regulation of the promotion of
off-label uses under the Food and Drug Modernization Act
and various “guidance” documents issued pursuant to this
legislation. Part II also describes some of the criminal and civil
penalties that can be imposed for violating the FDA’s restrictions on the marketing of off-label uses. Part III discusses
potential liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), with particular attention to two
recent cases, Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.18 and In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices, and
Products Liability Litigation.19 Part III will also discuss the
liability of drug companies under the False Claims Act for
directly and indirectly obtaining compensation from the federal
government for the sale of products for off-label uses. Tort
liability is the focus of Part IV. This includes tort claims based
on violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, fraudulent
misrepresentation, failure to warn about the risks of particular
off-label uses, and failure to test for risks associated with off14

Salbu, supra note 6, at 194.
See, e.g., Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1994);
Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1990).
16
Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 77.
17
See infra at II.B.
18
187 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1999).
19
433 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2006).
15
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label uses. Finally, Part V evaluates the FDA’s current policy
concerning the promotion of off-label uses and concludes that it
is too restrictive.
II.

FDA REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS

A.

The FDA Drug Approval Process

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)20
authorizes the FDA to regulate the manufacture and marketing of prescription drugs and medical devices.21 Under the
FDCA, the FDA must license any “new drug” before it may be
marketed.22 The approval process begins with the submission of
an Investigational New Drug Application.23 If the application
is approved, the sponsor may proceed with the New Drug
Application (“NDA”) process.24 The first phase of this process
usually involves animal testing to determine toxicity.25 The
drug then undergoes various types of clinical trials on human
subjects.26 When the clinical trials have been completed, the
sponsor must submit an NDA to the FDA for review. The NDA
must include a list of all of the drug’s ingredients, detailed
chemical information, detailed biological information, summaries of clinical testing results, a summary of the risks and
20

21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764-835 (1996); see also Michael D. Green &
William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2119, 2127-30 (2000) (discussing the difference between regulations for prescription drugs and medical devices). The FDA also regulates over-the-counter
pharmaceutical products. See Kenneth C. Baumgartner, A Historical Examination of
the FDA’s Review of the Safety and Effectiveness of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 463, 465-71 (1988).
22
21 U.S.C. § 355.
23
See id. § 355(i); Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Drug
Applications, http://www.fda.gov/cder/Regulatory/applications/ind_page_1.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2008).
24
Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 776 (1990). A somewhat different process
applies to the approval of medical devices. See Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 72-75.
25
James A. Wilsker, Note, One-Half Phen in the Morning/One Fen Before
Dinner: A Proposal for FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 795,
806 (1998).
26
Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs:
Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 756 (2005).
Clinical trials are usually divided into Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III: Phase I trials
determine whether a small number of test subjects can tolerate various levels of
exposure to the drug; Phase II trials evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the drug
on a larger group of persons for whom the drug is ultimately intended; and Phase III
trials carry out additional tests to determine the drug’s safety and efficacy. Id.
21
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benefits of the drug, an environmental impact statement,
marketing history, and proposed labeling.27
A drug may only be marketed and labeled for the uses
for which it received approval from the FDA.28 The FDA
requires that a drug’s label include information necessary for
safe and effective use, warnings, precautions, clinical pharmacology, indications, contraindications, and information about
adverse reactions.29 FDA-approved labeling, which is primarily
directed at physicians and other health care providers, is
included as a product package insert and as an entry in the
Physician’s Desk Reference.30 If a manufacturer wishes to add
new approved uses to a drug’s labeling, it must submit a new
NDA to the FDA.31
The FDA’s approval process for medical devices, on the
other hand, is governed by the Medical Device Amendments
(“MDA”).32 The MDA creates three classes of medical devices
that receive different levels of regulation. Class I devices are
merely subject to “general controls” by the FDA.33 Class II
devices are those for which “the general controls by themselves
are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety
and effectiveness of the device.”34 Class III medical devices are
those (1) for which there is insufficient information to determine that general controls and special controls are adequate to
provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, and
(2) are purported to be for sustaining human life or preventing
impairment of human health, or present an unreasonable risk
of illness or injury.35
27

21 C.F.R. § 314. 50 (2007); see also Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 75-76.
Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 76.
29
Salbu, supra note 6, at 186-87.
30
Edmund Polubinski, III, Note, Closing the Channels of Communication: A
First Amendment Analysis of the FDA’s Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of “OffLabel” Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 991, 995 (1997).
31
Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and “Off-Label” Uses
of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 277 (1996).
32
21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360n (2000).
33
Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The
Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 913 n.88 (1994). “General controls” under the
MDA include such requirements as maintenance of good manufacturing practices,
sanitary packaging, and accurate labeling. Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc.,
No. 95-58737, 1999 WL 811334, at *5 n.14 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1999). Class I devices include
items such as surgeon’s gloves, eye pads and ice bags. 21 C.F.R. § 880.6050 (2007).
34
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Class II devices include items such as tampons,
syringes, and neonatal incubators. 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5460, 880.5860, 880.5400 (2007).
35
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). Pacemakers and heart valves are examples of
Class III devices. 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3610, 870.3925 (2007).
28
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Ordinarily, the manufacturer of a Class III medical
device must submit a premarket approval application (“PMA”)
to the FDA before marketing the device in interstate commerce.36 The PMA must contain a full report of any clinical
investigations that concern the safety or effectiveness of the
device.37 It must also contain “a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and of the . . . principles of
operation, of such device.”38 In addition, it must include “a full
description of the methods used in, and the facilities and
controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when
relevant, packing and installation of, the device.”39 In the PMA,
the applicant must identify, discuss, and analyze
any other data, information, or report relevant to an evaluation of
the safety and effectiveness of the device known to or that should
reasonably be known to the applicant from any source, foreign or
domestic, including information derived from investigations other
than those proposed in the application and from commercial
marketing experience.40

The PMA must also include specimens of the labeling proposed
to be used for the device.41 A Class III medical device is not
subject to the PMA requirement if (1) it was marketed prior to
the MDA’s enactment42 and a regulation requiring submission
of PMAs has not been issued for the device or (2) it is
“substantially equivalent” to a predicate device, that is, one
marketed prior to the MDA’s enactment.43 Another exception to
the PMA process permits a Class III device that obtains an
Investigational Device Exemption (“IDE”) to be tested on
human subjects without obtaining PMA approval.44
Thus, manufacturers of both prescription drugs and
medical devices must satisfy the FDA that their products are
safe and effective before the agency will approve them for
marketing.
36

21 U.S.C. § 360e.
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(8)(i) (2007).
38
21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(B).
39
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(C).
40
21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(8)(ii) (2007).
41
21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(F).
42
Id. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
43
Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
44
See id. § 360j(g). An IDE allows researchers to conduct clinical trials
without first going through a formal PMA process in order to “encourage . . . the
discovery and development of useful devices . . . and maintain optimum freedom for
scientific investigators.” 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g).
37

2008]

B.

“THERE’S DANGER HERE, CHERIE!”

1259

FDA Regulation of the Promotion of Off-Label Uses
by Drug Manufacturers

Although the FDCA authorizes the FDA to regulate the
manufacture and marketing of prescription drugs and medical
devices, the FDA has never claimed any authority to regulate
the practice of medicine.45 Therefore, physicians may use FDAlicensed drugs or medical devices in any way they believe will
benefit their patients and are not limited to approved uses.46
However, the FDA can regulate advertising and promotion
activities by drug manufacturers. In the past, the FDA prohibited manufacturers from promoting a drug for any purpose
that had not been approved.47 A company that promoted
information about uses that had not received FDA approval
was subject to liability for “misbranding.”48 The only exception
to this policy was for the provision of information about offlabel uses when specifically requested by a physician.49 There
were two reasons for the FDA’s prohibition of the dissemination of information about off-label uses. First, the FDA was
concerned that the information about off-label uses provided by
pharmaceutical companies to doctors might be incomplete.50
Second, the FDA believed that allowing drug manufacturers to
furnish such information would encourage them to bypass the
FDA’s NDA process.51
Eventually, the FDA issued guidance documents that
permitted the dissemination of information about off-label uses
in published form and at independent medical education
programs. The first of these guidance documents sought to
control drug manufacturers’ distribution of “enduring materials,” such as textbooks and reprints of journal articles.52 In
1997, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (“FDAMA”),53 and Section 401 of the Act
45

Polubinski, supra note 30, at 999.
Beck & Azari, supra note 9, at 76.
47
Wilsker, supra note 25, at 808.
48
James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 295, 301 (2003).
49
Greene, supra note 5, at 49.
50
Weeks, supra note 8, at 657.
51
Greene, supra note 5, at 48-49.
52
Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800-52,801 (Oct. 8,
1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
53
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105115, § 401, 111 Stat. 2296, 2356 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 et seq. (2000)).
46
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incorporated the guidance provisions.54 According to FDAMA, a
manufacturer was allowed to provide health care practitioners,
pharmacy benefit managers, health insurance companies,
group health plans, or governmental agencies with information
about the safety, effectiveness, or benefits of an off-label use,
provided that the manufacturer filed a supplemental
application for the proposed off-label use with the FDA.55 In
addition, the information disseminated to these qualified
groups had to be in the form of unabridged peer-reviewed
articles or qualified reference publications.56 Furthermore, the
manufacturer was required to disclose that the use in question
had not been approved or cleared by the FDA.57
In 1997, the FDA also published the “Final Guidance on
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities”58 to
regulate continuing medical education (“CME”) programs at
which information about off-label uses was presented.59 The
CME Guidance gave FDA approval to CME programs in which
discussion of off-label uses was not influenced by pharmaceutical companies, but disapproved programs in which offlabel uses were discussed when the programs were controlled
or influenced by drug manufacturers.60 To that end, the CME
Guidance identified a number of factors to be considered in
determining whether a program was independent of manufacturer influence and, therefore, permissible.61
As mentioned above, Section 401 of the FDAMA allowed
drug companies to disseminate information about off-label uses
of FDA-approved products, but it expired on September 30,
54

Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa to 360aaa-6(a) (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a).
56
Id. § 360aaa-1(a).
57
Id. §360aaa(b)(6)(A)(i).
58
62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997).
59
I. Scott Bass et al., Off-Label Promotion: Is FDA’s Final Guidance on
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Programs Enforceable?, 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 193, 195 (1998).
60
Greene, supra note 5, at 49.
61
Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,097-99 (Dec. 3, 1997). These factors include (1) who
controls the content and selects the moderator and speakers; (2) whether drug
manufacturer funding is disclosed; (3) whether unapproved uses will be discussed;
(4) whether the central focus of the program is on one product; (5) the relationship
between the corporate sponsors and the CME provider; (6) the process by which the
audience is selected; (7) the availability of opportunities for meaningful discussion and
questioning; (8) the dissemination of information; (9) the existence of ancillary
promotional activities; and (10) complaints by the provider, participants or attendees
about attempts by the supporting company to influence the program’s content. Id.
55
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2006.62 Filling the regulatory void left by the FDAMA’s
expiration, the FDA promulgated on February 15, 2008 a draft
guidance document entitled “Good Reprint Practices,” which
identifies how drug manufacturers should distribute scientific
or medical journal reprints, articles, or reference works.63 This
draft guidance document provides that the article or reference
work recommending an off-label use should be published by an
organization that has an editorial board.64 In addition, the
publisher should fully disclose conflicts of interest or biases on
the part of any author, contributor, or editor associated with an
article.65 Articles should also be peer reviewed and published in
accordance with established procedures.66 Furthermore, the
draft guidance document discourages the distribution of special
supplements or publications that have been funded by the
manufacturer whose product is discussed in an article.67
Moreover, it provides that the FDA considers articles that are
not supported by credible medical evidence to be false and
misleading and prohibits manufacturers from distributing
them.68 The draft guidance document also requires that the
reprint or reference publication be distributed in unabridged
form.69 Finally, the draft guidance document makes it clear
that the FDA retains its power to determine whether
distribution of an article or publication constitutes promotion of
an unapproved “new use” or whether such a product may be
considered misbranded or adulterated under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.70
The new FDA policy on the promotion of off-label uses,
beginning with the passage of the FDAMA, is less restrictive
than its previous approach, which prohibited manufacturers
from providing any information about off-label uses unless
physicians specifically asked for it. However, commentators

62

Id.; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing Section 401).
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/
goodreprint.html.
64
Id. pt. IV.A.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. pt. IV.B.
70
Id. pt. III.
63
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have been critical of the guidance documents,71 and it appears
that drug companies have shown little enthusiasm for working
within the structure set forth by the FDA in these documents.
C.

Violations of FDA Regulations

A drug company that improperly promotes its products
for off-label uses will be subject to criminal sanctions and civil
liability.72 The FDA considers unauthorized promotion to be
misbranding.73
The recent experience of Purdue Pharma, manufacturer
of the prescription pain medication OxyContin, illustrates the
perils of misbranding and other violations of the FDCA. The
company was accused of encouraging physicians to prescribe
OxyContin for use every eight hours instead of the twelve-hour
dosage approved by the FDA.74 It eventually agreed to pay
$19.5 million to twenty-six states and the District of Columbia
to settle a civil suit based on its alleged promotion of off-label
use of the painkiller.75 This led Connecticut Attorney General
Richard Blumenthal to declare, “We are raising the bar on offlabel marketing—and other promotion tactics—that lead to
abuse and diversion of prescription drugs.”76 However, Purdue
Pharma suffered an even more serious blow when the U.S.
Department of Justice brought criminal charges against the
company and three of its top executives.77 Federal prosecutors
contended that Purdue Pharma had engaged in a fraudulent
and deceptive marketing campaign that falsely claimed that
71
E.g., Bass et al., supra note 59, at 209-12; Salbu, supra note 6, at 220-21;
Polubinski, supra note 30, at 993, 1031.
72
Violations of the FDCA can result in fines, imprisonment, and civil
penalties. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
73
Mark A. Ford, Note, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing
Liability for Off-Label Drug Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429, 438-39 (2003). The Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act generally considers a drug “misbranded” if its labeling fails
to contain “adequate directions for use.” 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2000). When the FDA
approves a prescription drug or medical device for marketing, it approves specific
labeling for the product. If a manufacturer promotes a drug for an unapproved use, its
FDA-approved labeling will not contain any directions for that use and thus will be
misbranded under § 352(f). Ford, supra, at 438.
74
Painkiller’s Maker Settles Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at C6.
75
Id.
76
Press Release, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, & Jerry Farrell, Jr.,
Attorney General, [Department of Consumer Protection] Commissioner [Conn.]
Announce Oxycontin Maker Agrees to Halt Illegal Marketing 1 (May 8, 2007),
available at http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/oxycontin_multistate_settlement.pdf .
77
Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit Over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2007, at A1.
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OxyContin, because of its timed-release formula, was more
resistant to abuse and less likely to cause addiction than
competing products such as Percocet.78 The federal government
also charged some company sales representatives with giving
doctors misleading scientific data to support their fraudulent
claims.79
Pursuant to an agreement, Purdue Pharma and the
three corporate officers pleaded guilty to these criminal
charges.80 As part of the plea bargain deal, Purdue Pharma
acknowledged that it had made false statements, and it agreed
to pay $470 million in fines and payments to various state and
federal agencies as well as $130 million to settle civil lawsuits
brought against the company by former patients who claimed
to have become addicted to OxyContin.81 According to federal
prosecutors, the $600 million in fines and civil penalties that
Purdue Pharma agreed to pay amounted to ninety percent of
the profits that it initially made from OxyContin sales.82
Furthermore, as part of the plea bargain deal, the court
sentenced the company to five years’ probation.83
Three company executives also pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor charges of misbranding OxyContin, a violation of
the FDCA that does not require proof that the defendants
intended to defraud doctors or consumers or that they knew
about the wrongdoing of others.84 These officials agreed to pay a
total of $34.5 million in fines.85 At a “lengthy and highly
emotional hearing” in federal district court, parents of those
who had died from overdoses of OxyContin condemned the
company officials and urged the court to reject the plea
agreements and sentence the officials to jail terms.86 However,
the court accepted the plea agreements and only sentenced the
three officials to three years’ probation and 400 hours each of
community service in drug treatment programs.87 Nevertheless,
78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Barry Meier, Big Part of OxyContin Profit Was Consumed by Penalties,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C3.
83
Barry Meier, 3 Officials Sentenced in Case Involving OxyContin, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C4.
84
Id.
85
Meier, supra note 82.
86
Meier, supra note 83.
87
Id.
79
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the judge expressed disappointment that he was unable to send
the defendants to prison because federal prosecutors had not
produced evidence that the company officials were aware of the
wrongdoing at Purdue Pharma.
Purdue Pharma illustrates that pharmaceutical companies and their executive officers who violate FDA regulations
by promoting off-label uses run the risk of incurring huge fines
or even incarceration if they are caught.
III.

LIABILITY BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF THE RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT

Two other sources of statutory liability for manufacturers that promote off-label uses for their products are the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
and the False Claims Act.
A.

RICO

A number of RICO cases have been brought against
pharmaceutical companies for illegally promoting off-label uses
of prescription drugs. Although drug companies have won
several of these cases, others are still in litigation.
1. Elements of RICO
RICO was enacted in 1970 to combat the infiltration of
organized crime into legitimate business enterprises.88 The
statute imposes criminal and civil liability on any person who
invests income from a pattern of racketeering activity in an
enterprise,89 acquires an interest in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity,90 conducts an enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,91 or who
conspires to do any of these things.92 An “enterprise” includes
“any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
88

Beth S. Schipper, Note, Civil RICO and Parens Patriae: Lowering
Litigation Barriers Through State Intervention, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 431
(1983); see also Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A
Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1354
(2001).
89
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
90
Id. § 1962(b).
91
Id. § 1962(c).
92
Id. § 1962(d).
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legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.”93 RICO defines “racketeering
activity” to include various criminal acts such as mail fraud,
wire fraud, drug trafficking, murder, arson, gambling, extortion, bribery, and embezzlement.94 According to the statute,
a “pattern of racketeering activity” consists of two or more acts
of racketeering that occur within ten years of each other and
that reflect a relationship and continuity in terms of purpose,
results, participants, victims, or methods, but which are
sufficiently distinct so that they amount to more than a single
episode or an isolated occurrence.95 Because at least two of
these offenses must be committed in order make out a claim
under RICO, they are referred to as “predicate acts.”96
There are two types of civil remedies available under
RICO: damages and equitable relief. Any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a RICO violation may sue
for treble damages.97 In addition, a court may grant various
equitable remedies, including restricting the defendants from
engaging in certain activities in the future and even dissolving
or restructuring the enterprise.98 Furthermore, RICO expressly
authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to seek equitable relief in
appropriate cases.99
2. Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(“RPR”) illustrates the application of RICO in the context of
off-label drug use promotion.100 The case involved the drugs
Lovenox, Taxotere, Rilutek, and Nasacort AQ.101 An RPR
employee and three former employees brought a civil claim
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. § 1961(4).
Id. § 1961(1).
Id. § 1961(5).
Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2001).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Id. § 1964(a).
Id. § 1964(b).
See Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941 (8th Cir.

1999).
101
Id. at 946 (8th Cir. 1999). Lovenox was approved for use as a treatment for
blood clotting; Taxotere was approved for cancer therapy; Rilutex was approved for
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS,” also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease); and
Nasacort was approved to treat asthma. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition for
Respondent Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals Inc. at 4, Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Pharm., Inc., 528 U.S. 1117 (2000) (No. 99-803), available at 1999 WL 33632777.
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under RICO against RPR; Genecom, RPR’s advertising agency;
and a number of physicians who allegedly received illegal
payments from RPR. The plaintiffs claimed that RPR illegally
marketed drugs for off-label uses by providing information
about off-label uses to its sales representatives and encouraging them to solicit physicians to prescribe its products for
such uses.102 In addition, according to the plaintiffs, RPR,
through Genecom, engaged physicians who prescribed RPR
products for off-label uses to speak at CME events and paid
them to promote off-label uses.103 The plaintiffs also alleged
that RPR set sales quotas for its staff that implicitly included
off-label sales and that when the plaintiffs reported these
unlawful promotional activities to RPR lawyers, they were told
to rewrite promotional event payment documents and destroy
other evidence of illegal promotions.104
Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that RPR and other
defendants also violated RICO by conducting or participating
in a pattern of racketeering activity by obtaining money from
product sales generated by the illegal promotion of off-label
uses of its products.105 The plaintiffs declared that RPR and
other defendants sent promotional materials and obtained or
paid money through the mail, transmitted promotional
materials and made false representations through the use of
interstate telephonic communications, and used the facilities of
interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds gained from
illegal kickbacks and payments made to influence the promotion and use of RPR products.106
Notwithstanding these allegations of wrongdoing, the
lower court dismissed the plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims for lack
of standing,107 and this decision was affirmed on appeal.108 The
court declared that RICO’s civil enforcement provisions
required that a plaintiff be “injured in his [or her] business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962.”109 Therefore,
in order to have standing to sue under RICO, a plaintiff must
allege (1) an injury to “business or property” (2) caused “by
102
103
104
105
106
107

Hamm, 187 F.3d at 946.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 176 F.R.D. 566, 571 (D. Minn.

1997).
108
109

Hamm, 187 F.3d at 954.
Id. at 951 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
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reason of” a RICO violation.110 The court pointed out that the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.111
that plaintiffs must be injured by conduct that constitutes
racketeering activity (that is, predicate acts) and not by other
wrongful acts committed by the defendant to have standing to
sue under RICO.112 This requirement is imposed because the
compensable harm under RICO is the commission of predicate
acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.113 In this
case, however, the defendants’ fraudulent scheme to promote
off-label uses of its products had not been directed at the
plaintiffs, but at hospital administrators, physicians, and other
medical personnel who prescribed and purchased RPR’s
pharmaceutical products.114 The court concluded that since the
employees had not been the intended targets of the alleged
racketeering activity, they did not have standing to bring a
civil RICO suit.115
Although the plaintiffs were not directly injured by
RPR’s illegal promotion of off-label uses of its products, they
argued that they suffered the requisite injury to business or
property by alleging that they had been terminated, denied
promotions or raises, and defamed, as well as had lost stock
options, after having criticized or refused to participate in
RPR’s off-label promotion scheme.116 In response, the court
pointed out that it had rejected similar allegations in Bowman
v. Western Auto Supply Co.117 as a viable basis for a civil RICO
lawsuit.118 According to the court in Bowman, “The simple act of
discharging an employee . . . does not constitute racketeering
activity as defined in RICO, and thus does not fall within the
definition of what the Supreme Court has termed ‘predicate
acts’ under RICO.”119 The plaintiffs argued that Bowman did
not bar their RICO claims for defamation or damage to their
business reputations.120 The court, however, declared that the
plaintiffs could only sue under RICO if their injuries were
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985).
Hamm, 187 F.3d at 952.
Id. (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 947.
985 F.2d 383, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1993).
Hamm, 187 F.3d at 952.
Bowman, 985 F.2d at 385-86.
Hamm, 187 F.3d at 953.
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directly caused by RICO violations.121 In this case, since the
plaintiffs were not the targets of the fraudulent scheme, any
damage to the plaintiffs’ business reputations was too indirect
and remotely related to the defendant’s racketeering activities
to support their RICO claim.122
The court also concluded that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they failed to show any injury to their
“business or property” as required by section 1964(c) of the
RICO statute.123 The court observed that damage to one’s
business reputation is a personal injury and not an injury to
business or property.124 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that they could bring a conspiracy claim under RICO
as long as their injuries were caused by an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the act in question
was not a predicate act.125 Although the court acknowledged
that there was a circuit split on this issue, it decided to treat
conspiracy the same as other claims for which a predicate act
was required, as the Bowman court had done, because
“[i]mposing the predicate act requirement on civil claims based
on violations of § 1962(d) narrows the focus of those suits to the
specific racketeering activity that lies at the heart of the RICO
statute.”126
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer illustrates some of the
difficulties plaintiffs face in civil RICO cases. However, as the
Neurontin case discussed below shows, RICO may still be a
potential source of liability for drug companies that illegally
promote off-label uses.
3. In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices, and
Products Liability Litigation
In re Neurontin Marketing serves as another example
of how RICO claims may be brought against pharmaceutical

121

Id. (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70

(1992)).
122

Id. at 954.
Id.
124
Id. (citing Chicago Heights v. Lobue, 914 F. Supp. 279, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
In re Teledyne Def. Contracting Derivative Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 n.1 (C.D.
Cal. 1993)).
125
Id.
126
Id. (quoting Bowman, 985 F.2d at 388).
123
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companies for promoting off-label uses.127 The case involved a
class action by medical insurers against Pfizer and WarnerLambert Co., alleging that the pharmaceutical companies had
engaged in a “fraudulent scheme to market the prescription
drug Neurontin for a variety of off-label uses.”128 The defendants moved to dismiss both the Amended Class Complaint
and the First Coordinated Amended Complaint.129 A magistrate
judge recommended that the motion be granted in part and
denied in part.130 After a hearing, the district court endorsed
most of the magistrate’s report, holding that the plaintiffs
adequately alleged the existence of an enterprise and a pattern
of racketeering activity.131 In addition, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the existence of a
conspiracy.132
The court’s opinion primarily focused on whether the
plaintiffs adequately alleged the existence of an “enterprise”
and whether the defendants had engaged in a “pattern of
racketeering activity.” The court noted that the existence of an
enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity engaged in
by the enterprise are separate and distinct elements of a RICO
claim.133 However, according to the court, “proof of these two
elements need not be separate or distinct but may in fact
‘coalesce.’”134
With regard to the enterprise element, the court
observed that according to the RICO statute, an enterprise
includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”135 Although the
Supreme Court has declared that this language should be

127
See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F.
Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2006).
128
Id. at 176. In 1994, the FDA approved Neurontin for use as an adjunctive
treatment for epilepsy. However, about half of Neurontin prescriptions were for offlabel uses such as pain control and mono-therapy for epilepsy as well as treatment for
bipolar conditions and attention deficit disorder. United States ex rel. Franklin v.
Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D. Mass. 2001).
129
In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 176-77.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 178-84.
132
Id. at 184.
133
Id. at 178.
134
Id. (citing United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)).
135
Id. at 177 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)).
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interpreted broadly,136 an enterprise is limited to “a group of
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging
in a course of conduct.”137
In the Neurontin case, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had created a large association-in-fact type of
enterprise, composed of numerous marketing firms and
physicians, in order to illegally promote off-label uses of
Neurontin.138 As an alternative theory, the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendants had created two smaller enterprises: one
that carried out peer-to-peer selling of Neurontin for off-label
uses and one that produced ghost-written articles promoting
off-label uses of the drug.139 In addition to these theories, the
plaintiffs also contended that the defendants had created
enterprises with various medical marketing firms, with or
without physicians who promoted Neurontin.140 To support
these claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
joined together with marketing firms both to host events
designed to promote Neurontin and also to publish articles that
proclaimed the drug’s effectiveness for various off-label uses.141
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants and their medical
marketing partners had organized events designed to tout
Neurontin while giving the appearance of being independent,
and physicians had been paid by the defendants or their
medical marketing firms to speak at these events and describe
the favorable results they had obtained from off-label uses of
Neurontin.142 Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had selected material from the medical literature about offlabel uses of Neurontin, had sent it to medical marketing firms
who would then write articles based on this material, and then
had paid physicians to take credit as authors of the pieces
when they were published.143
In considering whether the plaintiffs established the
existence of an enterprise, the court first observed that an
enterprise must have a common purpose to satisfy the enterprise requirement. According to the plaintiffs, the common
136

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985); United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981).
137
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
138
In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
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purpose of each of the alleged enterprises was to market
Neurontin for off-label uses in violation of FDA regulations.144
The magistrate’s report conceded that members of the alleged
enterprises may have shared a common purpose—to promote
off-label uses of Neurontin—but noted that they did not share a
common purpose to commit mail and wire fraud, the predicate
acts alleged by the plaintiffs to support the RICO claim.145 After
observing that “[t]here has been considerable confusion as to
whether the common purpose needs to be illegal,” the court
declared that the complaints adequately alleged an unlawful
common purpose for each of the enterprises, “namely to
illegally promote off-label uses of Neurontin.”146 However, as
the court acknowledged, violation of FDA regulations was not
“actionable” because violations of FDA regulations do not give
rise to a private tort claim against the violator.147
The court distinguished In re Pharmaceutical Industry
Average Wholesale Price Litigation, a case where the plaintiffs
tried to establish the existence of an enterprise composed of
drug manufacturers and publishers of prescription drug price
compendiums.148 In that case, the plaintiffs contended there
was a common purpose between the manufacturers that had
fraudulently inflated the average wholesale prices of drugs and
the publishers of prescription drug compendia listing those
inflated prices.149 However, the court held that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the enterprise requirement under RICO
because the publishers had been indifferent to the success of
the drug companies’ fraudulent scheme and had had no intent
themselves to defraud the medical community or the federal
government when they published the price information.150 In
contrast, the plaintiffs in Neurontin alleged that the members
of the enterprise joined together to engage in unlawful conduct
to achieve a shared goal, thereby satisfying the common
purpose element of the pleading.151
In the Neurontin court’s discussion of the enterprise
requirement, it observed that it was not enough for the
144

Id.
Id. at 178-79.
146
Id. at 179-80.
147
Id.; see infra Part IV.A.1.
148
Id.; see In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 307 F. Supp.
2d 196, 201-03 (D. Mass. 2004).
149
In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 180-81.
145
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plaintiffs to demonstrate that the parties had a common goal or
purpose; they must also prove that the alleged enterprise
was “an ongoing organization, not a set of smaller ad-hoc
conspiracies engaged in the same activities independent of
one another.”152 The magistrate’s report found that the drug
manufacturers, medical marketing firms, and physicians did
not work together as part a cohesive group, but instead
resembled a “hub-and-spoke” assemblage of a conspiracy.153 The
court examined the various enterprises identified by the
plaintiffs to determine if any of them could be characterized as
ongoing organizations functioning as continuing units and
concluded that the relationship between the manufacturers of
Neurontin and various marketing firms constituted an ongoing
organization and not merely a series of ad hoc activities.154
In making this determination, the court first examined
the alleged “global enterprise,” consisting of the defendant drug
companies, all of the medical marketing firms, and all of the
physicians who made presentations or wrote articles advocating off-label uses of Neurontin.155 The court agreed with the
magistrate’s report that neither the medical marketing firms
nor the physicians worked together with the defendants as a
cohesive unit; rather, they had formed a hub-and-spoke
operation, with the drug companies at the center managing
several independent relationships.156 According to the court, the
medical marketing firms and the physicians did not constitute
an enterprise for purposes of RICO because there had been no
“rim” to connect all of the spokes of the wheel.157 In other words,
the drug companies had communicated with individual medical
marketing firms and physicians, but individual medical marketing firms and physicians had not communicated with one
another.158 Since the plaintiffs could not show that there was
a network involving all of these drug companies, medical

152

Id. at 182.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.; see also VanDenBroeck CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d 696, 700
(6th Cir. 2000); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 295 F. Supp. 2d 148, 174
n.29 (D. Mass. 2003); First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 820 F. Supp. 89,
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
153
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marketing firms, and physicians, the court rejected their claim
that a global enterprise existed.159
Next, the court considered whether the alleged various
“sub-entities” devoted to peer-to-peer selling of Neurontin and
publication of articles touting off-label uses of the drug
qualified as enterprises for purposes of RICO.160 The court
concluded that these sub-entities had been composed of the
same parties as the global enterprise and that, once again, the
plaintiffs neither alleged the existence of a general agreement
among these parties to carry out a common purpose nor alleged
that there had been a cohesive network among these parties
to accomplish common goals.161 The court determined consequently that the sub-entity theory suffered from the same
deficiency as the global enterprise allegation under RICO.162
Finally, the court evaluated the plaintiffs’ claim that a
series of smaller enterprises had existed, each comprised of
the drug manufacturers and one of the physicians or marketing firms, effectively making each hub-and-spoke association
a separate enterprise for purposes of RICO.163 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that all the
members of these purported enterprises had shared a common
illegal purpose of promoting off-label uses of Neurontin.164 The
remaining question, therefore, was whether these smaller
associations had been ongoing organizations or merely ad hoc
criminal conspiracies.165 In the case of associations between the
defendant drug companies and medical marketing firms, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had formulated “tactical
plans” with various marketing firms to promote off-label uses
of Neurontin on an ongoing basis and that there had been
regular communication between the defendants and these
firms.166 In addition, there had been financial ties between the
parties as the defendants had transferred money to medical
marketing firms to pay physicians to make presentations and
claim authorship of articles endorsing off-label uses of the
defendants’ product.167 In light of these allegations, the court
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

In re Neurontin, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
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Id. at 183.
Id.
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Id.
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concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the existence
of ongoing relationships between the defendants and various
medical marketing firms.168
The enterprises referred to in the First Coordinated
Amended Complaint were not limited to the defendants and
various medical marketing firms as they were in the Amended
Class Complaint; they had also included physicians who were
allegedly paid by these marketing firms to promote off-label
uses of Neurontin.169 Accordingly, the court considered whether
physicians who had been paid to promote off-label uses of
Neurontin were also part of these enterprises. Neither
complaint alleged that these physicians knew that they were
part of a “stable” maintained by the drug companies and the
medical marketing firms or that they had been acting with
other physicians in a coordinated effort to promote Neurontin.170 However, the complaints did maintain that some of these
physicians had had ongoing financial relationships with the
defendants and their medical marketing firms and that the
physicians had been essential to the success of the defendants’
scheme.171 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
failed to allege continuing relationships between any specific
physicians and specific medical marketing firms sufficient
for these physicians to be considered members of a RICO
enterprise.172
As a result of the court’s refusal to dismiss all of the
plaintiffs’ complaints, the case proceeded to discovery, which
will likely be hard fought and protracted.173

168

Id.
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 184. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity by fraudulently promoting off-label uses of Neurontin
through the use of interstate mails and wire communications. Id. at 177. Thus, the
predicate acts alleged were mail fraud and wire fraud. Id. at 179. However, the parties
did not choose to address the predicate acts requirement at this stage of the
proceedings. Instead, the court agreed to allow the plaintiffs to plead the particulars of
the defendants’ use of interstate mails and wires after discovery. Id. at 184 n.5.
173
See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D.
55 (D. Mass. 2007) (overruling an objection to a motion to compel discovery).
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The False Claims Act

The False Claims Act (“FCA”)174 provides another potential source of liability for drug companies that market their
products for off-label uses.
1. Elements of the False Claims Act
The False Claims Act is intended to deter the “submission of false or fraudulent claims to the government, to provide
restitution to the government for money fraudulently taken
from it, and to punish those who defraud the government.”175
The Act imposes liability on any person who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, to . . . the United States
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval” or who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent
claim paid or approved by the Government.”176 The Act further
provides that any person who submits a false claim will be
liable for treble damages for any loss suffered by the
government.177 In addition, a defendant may be liable for a civil
penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim that he or she
submits to the government.178
The Act defines “knowingly” to refer to a person who
“(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;
or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information . . . .”179 Thus, innocent mistake and even ordinary
negligence are defenses to FCA liability.180 The FCA does not
provide a definition of “claim,” but courts have defined it as “a
demand for money or for some transfer of public property.”181
174

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting
the Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1998). The FCA was enacted during the Civil War to combat
procurement fraud and price gouging by army contractors. John Terrence et al., Clear
and Convincing to Whom? The False Claims Act and Its Burden of Proof Standard:
Why the Government Needs a Big Stick, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1423 (2000).
176
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(2).
177
Id. § 3729(a)(7).
178
Id.
179
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
180
Pamela H. Bucy, Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat
Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (1999).
181
United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
175
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The term also includes material representations made to avoid
paying money owed to the government.182 Fraud or fraudulent
conduct must be material in the sense that it could influence
the government’s payment decision.183 In addition, there must
be “a causal relationship between the false claim and the
government’s injury.”184
The FCA authorizes private individuals, known as
relators,185 to bring qui tam186 actions on behalf of the U.S.
government.187 Relators may be private citizens, employees of
government contractors, or employees of government agencies
and private companies, including suppliers and competitors of
the defendant.188 In order to maintain a qui tam action, the
relator must comply with the strict procedural requirements of
the FCA.189 The private plaintiff must, for example, serve a copy
of the complaint and disclose substantially all material
evidence in the plaintiff’s possession to the federal government.190 Upon receipt of the complaint, the government may
investigate the claims and may elect to intervene and take over
prosecution of the action.191 The plaintiff’s complaint remains
under seal during the government’s period of investigation.192 If
the government chooses to intervene, the government itself
conducts the civil action.193 If the government chooses not to
intervene in the matter, the private plaintiff has the right to
continue to prosecute the case on behalf of the government.194
However, the relator will not be able to recover attorneys’ fees

182

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7).
Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 189 (2001).
184
Id. at 191.
185
Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 477, 478 (1995).
186
“Qui tam” is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac
parte sequitur,” which means “he who sues on behalf of the King as well as for
himself.” Bucy, supra note 180, at 57-58.
187
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
188
William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices
in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (1996).
189
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
190
Id. § 3730(b)(2).
191
Id.
192
Id. This period is at least sixty days, but the DOJ may seek extensions of
the sixty-day waiting period. Kovacic, supra note 188, at 1817.
193
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(A).
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Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
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or other litigation expenses if he or she is not successful.195 If
the government successfully prosecutes the action, the relator
is entitled to between 15% and 25% of the government’s
recovery,196 but if the government does not pursue the case and
the relator successfully prosecutes it instead, he or she will be
awarded between 25% and 30% of the judgment.197
Since the FCA’s initial passage in 1863, Congress has
amended it on several occasions. In 1943, Congress prohibited
all qui tam actions based on evidence or information that the
government had when the action was brought.198 After the
amendment was enacted, there was a significant decrease in
the use of the FCA’s qui tam provisions.199 Consequently, in
1986, Congress set out to encourage more private enforcement
actions by increasing financial awards to private plaintiffs,
lowering the plaintiff’s burden of proof, and allowing a private
plaintiff to participate in actions in which the government
elects to intervene.200 At the same time, in order to discourage
“parasitic” lawsuits, Congress added a new jurisdictional
provision to the FCA.201 A qui tam suit may be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction if the allegations in the FCA complaint have
been previously disclosed publicly or if the lawsuit is based
on the publicly disclosed information.202 Public disclosure
may come from such sources as criminal, civil, or administrative hearings; congressional, administrative, or Government
Accounting Office reports; hearings, audits, or investigations;
and reports in the news media.203 The issue of whether a qui
tam action is “based upon” a public disclosure arises “when the
information contained in the qui tam action has been publicly
disclosed, but the relator has not relied upon it in bringing the
195
Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government’s Interests:
Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government’s Right to Veto
Settlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1051-52 (1998).
196
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
197
Id. § 3730(d)(2).
198
Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False
Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 105, 107 (1999).
199
Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims Act: Congress Giveth and the Courts
Taketh Away, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 378-79 (2002).
200
Krause, supra note 183, at 133-34; Frederick M. Morgan, Jr. & Julie
Webster Popham, The Last Privateers Encounter Sloppy Seas: Inconsistent OriginalSource Jurisprudence Under the Federal False Claims Act, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 163,
170 (1998).
201
Morgan & Popham, supra note 200, at 168-69.
202
Bucy, supra note 180, at 88.
203
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000).
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qui tam action.”204 The prevailing rule is that a qui tam action
is “based upon” public disclosure if the action is “supported by”
or is “substantially identical” to the publicly disclosed information.205 However, even if the allegations in the lawsuit are
based upon publicly disclosed information, the relator is not
barred from bringing a qui tam action if he or she is the
“original source” of the information.206 The False Claims Act
defines an “original source” as “an individual who has direct
and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action under
this section which is based on the information.”207
2. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis serves as
an example of how a case may be brought under the FCA
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for the promotion of
off-label drug use.208 The case involved two prescription drugs
manufactured by Parke-Davis, Neurontin and Accupril. In
1994, the FDA had approved Neurontin for use as an
adjunctive treatment for epilepsy.209 However, according to the
relator, by 1996, more than half of Neurontin sales had been
for off-label uses such as pain control, mono-therapy for
epilepsy, treatment of bipolar conditions and treatment of
attention deficit disorder.210 Furthermore, half of these off-label
uses had been allegedly reimbursed by the federal government
either indirectly through Medicaid or directly through
purchases by the Veterans Administration (“VA”).211 The relator
also claimed that Parke-Davis had promoted Accupril, an ACE
inhibitor approved for the treatment of hypertension and heart
failure, for off-label uses.212

204

Bucy, supra note 180, at 95.
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 55253 (10th Cir. 1992).
206
Bucy, supra note 180, at 88-89.
207
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
208
See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert
Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001).
209
Id. at 45.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
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In 1996, a former employee filed a nine-count qui tam
action charging that the defendant had engaged in a fraudulent
scheme to promote the sale of Neurontin and Accupril for offlabel uses and that this illegal marketing campaign had caused
numerous false claims to be submitted to the Veterans
Administration and to the federal government for reimbursement under its Medicaid program.213 The complaint remained
under seal for several years while the Justice Department
decided whether to intervene.214 Finally, in December of 1999,
the complaint was unsealed and the litigation began in
earnest.215 The Justice Department decided to participate only
on an amicus curiae basis, but reserved the right to intervene
as plaintiff at a later date.216
The relator, Dr. David Franklin, had been employed by
the defendant as a “medical liaison” for about five months
during 1996.217 Although medical liaisons ordinarily work in the
research divisions of drug manufacturers, Dr. Franklin claimed
that Parke-Davis’s medical liaisons were employed exclusively
as promotion personnel.218 According to Franklin, the defendant
instructed its medical liaisons “to make exaggerated or false
claims concerning the safety and efficacy of Parke-Davis’s
drugs for off-label uses.”219 Medical liaisons had been
encouraged to inflate their scientific credentials and to pose as
research personnel instead of sales representatives to bolster
their credibility with physicians.220 Furthermore, when physicians had asked about whether patients could be reimbursed
for off-label prescriptions by Medicaid or other insurers,
“medical liaisons were instructed to coach doctors on how to
conceal the off-label nature of the prescription.”221 The relator
also alleged that doctors had received kickbacks for prescribing
large quantities of the defendant’s products, including cash
payments and gifts.222 Finally, he claimed that Parke-Davis
had attempted to conceal its promotion of off-label uses from
the FDA by shredding and falsifying documents and by
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 43.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
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encouraging medical liaisons to conduct their marketing
activities without leaving a “paper trail” that might be
discovered by the FDA.
The first issue the court addressed was the requirement
imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that “the
circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with
particularity.”223 This particularity requirement should be read
in pari materia with Rule 8(a), which allows a plaintiff to make
“a short and plain statement” for relief.224 The court explained
that these two provisions, taken together, required the relator
to allege the circumstances of the fraud—the “‘who, what,
when, where, and how’ of the alleged fraud”—but did not
require that he plead all of the evidence or facts that supported
his allegation.225
Applying these principles to the relator’s Medicaid fraud
claims, the court concluded that the complaint, standing alone,
lacked the specificity required by Rule 9(b).226 However, the
court allowed the relator to supplement the allegations in his
complaint with the more specific information contained in his
disclosure to the government pursuant to the FCA in 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(2).227 The disclosure, which had been provided to
both the court and the defendant, described Dr. Franklin’s
experiences as a “medical liaison” for Parke-Davis and was
supported by approximately twenty exhibits.228 Viewed in light
of the relator’s disclosure, the court found that his complaint
contained allegations of fraud with respect to the off-label
promotion of Neurontin sufficient to satisfy the particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b), at least with regard to the Medicaid
sales.229 According to the court, the complaint described a
fraudulent scheme designed to increase the submission of off223
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). According to the court, the purpose of Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirement is to enable defendants to prepare a meaningful defense, to
prevent conclusory allegations of fraud from serving as a basis for “strike suits and
fishing expeditions,” and to protect defendants against groundless charges that may
damage their reputations. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (citing New England Data
Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 292 (1st Cir. 1987)).
224
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
225
Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47.
226
Id. at 47.
227
Id. The U.S.C. provides that “[a] copy of the complaint and written
disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses
shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2000).
228
Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
229
Id. at 48.
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label Neurontin prescriptions for payment by Medicaid (but
not the VA) and identified various false statements made to
physicians to induce them to prescribe Neurontin for off-label
uses.230
As far as the “who” requirement was concerned, the
relator’s disclosure identified by name various individuals at
Parke-Davis who allegedly had instructed the medical liaisons
on how to fraudulently promote off-label uses of the drug.231 In
addition, it listed all of the medical liaisons by name, as well as
the physicians who had been contacted and given false
information and kickbacks in order to encourage them to
increase their off-label prescriptions.232 This was sufficient to
satisfy the court. The court determined that the relator also
fulfilled the “what” requirement by alleging that the defendant
had caused numerous Neurontin prescriptions to be submitted
for payment by Medicaid knowing that they were ineligible for
payment because they had been prescribed for an off-label
use.233 The “when” requirement was met as well since the
relator specified the five-month period during which he had
been employed by Parke-Davis.234 Finally, the court found that
the relator fulfilled the “how” requirement by describing in the
complaint and the disclosure the defendant’s fraudulent
marketing campaign involving kickbacks and misleading
statements designed to encourage doctors to prescribe
Neurontin for unapproved uses.235
But the court dismissed the portion of the complaint
alleging that Parke-Davis had promoted off-label uses of
Neurontin in direct sales to the VA.236 The court ruled that the
relator’s allegations were not specific enough because they did
not identify which Parke-Davis employees had engaged in
fraudulent conduct, where the conduct had taken place, or
which VA personnel had been involved.237 In addition, the
complaint failed to identify any specific fraudulent statements
that the defendant’s employees had made to VA personnel.238
230

Id.
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. The court did not explicitly discuss the “where” requirement, but
presumably felt that it was satisfied as well.
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Id. at 49-50.
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The court also dismissed a count of the complaint
alleging that the defendant had illegally promoted off-label
uses of Accupril.239 Specifically, the complaint alleged that
Parke-Davis employees had falsely informed physicians that
scientific studies had shown Accupril to be more effective than
other ACE inhibitors.240 However, as the court observed, the
relator’s disclosure did not identify any of the medical liaisons
who had been involved in the fraud, any of the doctors who had
received false information, or any of the false claims that had
been made.241
Having concluded that some of the claims against
Parke-Davis were specific enough to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirement, the court then responded to the
defendant’s argument that its conduct did not constitute a
violation of the False Claims Act.242 First, the defendant
contended that the relator’s lawsuit was an improper attempt
to use the FCA to create a private cause of action for a violation
of the FDCA.243 The court conceded that Congress did not
authorize either the FDA or private individuals to enforce the
agency’s prohibition against the marketing of drugs for off-label
uses through civil actions for damages.244 However, the court
held that the FCA could be invoked to bring a civil action when
the violation of an FDA rule or regulation enabled the
defendant to obtain a government benefit by fraud.245
Therefore, a drug manufacturer who knowingly causes a false
statement to be made in order to have a false claim paid or
approved by the government is subject to liability under the
FCA regardless of whether its conduct also violates an FDA
regulation.246
Parke-Davis also argued that its promotion of off-label
uses had not involved the sort of false statement or fraudulent
conduct necessary to constitute a violation of the FCA since it
had only made truthful statements to physicians who provided
services to patients covered by Medicaid.247 However, the court
did not need to decide this issue since Parke-Davis was also
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
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accused of engaging in a course of fraudulent conduct,
including knowingly making false statements encouraging
doctors to submit claims not eligible for payment under the
Medicaid program.248 The FCA claim arose not from the fact
that the defendant had promoted off-label uses of its products,
but rather from the fact that it had engaged in fraudulent
conduct causing claims to be submitted to Medicaid for
unauthorized uses.249
Furthermore, Parke-Davis maintained that the independent actions of the physicians who wrote the off-label
prescriptions and the pharmacists who filled them had been an
intervening force that broke the chain of legal causation from
the pharmaceutical manufacturer.250 However, the court
pointed out that such an intervening force would break the
causal connection only if it were unforeseeable.251 In this case,
the participation of doctors and pharmacists in the submission
of false claims to Medicaid had not only been foreseeable but
was the intended result of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme.252
Thus, this argument by the defendant was also unavailing.
Finally, Parke-Davis contended that any false statements that it had made to physicians were not material to the
government’s decision to pay claims for off-label prescriptions
of Neurontin.253 The court, however, noted that a defendant
need not make a false claim directly to the government to be
held liable under the FCA; it was sufficient in this case for the
relator to allege that Parke-Davis had knowingly caused the
submission of false claims through a fraudulent course of
conduct.254 The fact that the prescriptions had been for an offlabel use was material because the government would not have
paid for such prescriptions if it had known the use for which
they had been submitted.255 While the court acknowledged that
the relator’s theory of liability was somewhat novel and
expansive, it concluded that the language of the FCA supports
the notion that one who causes a false or fraudulent claim
to be made may be held liable.256 The court supported this
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
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interpretation of the Act by noting that “the terms of the FCA
must be read liberally in accordance with their remedial
purpose.”257
Thus, the court dismissed some of the counts in the
relator’s complaint, but allowed the critical claim to go
forward.258 In 2004, the case was settled when WarnerLambert, the parent company of Parke-Davis, pleaded guilty to
two criminal FDCA misbranding violations and settled the civil
cases, ultimately paying $430 million in criminal fines and civil
damages.259 The relator, Dr. Franklin, received $24.6 million
as part of the settlement between the defendant and the
Department of Justice.260
3. United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc.
The relator in United States ex rel. Hess v. SanofiSynthelabo, Inc. was less successful than Dr. Franklin in
bringing an FCA claim against a pharmaceutical company for
promoting off-label uses. In Hess, the relator brought a qui tam
action against his former employer, Sanofi-Synthelabo, alleging
that it had fraudulently marketed drugs to physicians for offlabel uses.261 For the reasons explained below, a federal district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b).262
The relator, who had worked for the defendant as a
sales representative from 2001 until 2004, claimed that the
defendant had relied upon incomplete, unreliable, and misleading clinical data to promote off-label uses of its drugs
Eloxatin and Elitek.263 In 2002, Eloxatin had been approved by
the FDA to help treat fourth-stage colorectal cancer.264 That
same year, the FDA had approved Elitek “for the treatment
and prevention of tumor lyses syndrome . . . in pediatric
257

Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
Id. at 55.
259
Jack Cinquegrana & Diana K. Lloyd, Shifting Perspective on Off-Label
Promotion, PHARM. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.pharmexec.findpharma.com/
pharmexec/ article/articleDetail.jsp?id=282490.
260
Evelyn Pringle, Off-Label Prescribing of Prescription Drugs: Tactics Pfizer
Used in Promoting Off-Label Use of Neurontin (pt. 2), ONLINE J., May 31, 2006,
http://www.onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_855.shtml.
261
United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., No. 4;05CV570, 2006
WL 1064127, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2006).
262
Id. at *12.
263
Id. at *1-2.
264
Id. at *2.
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patients,” but declined to approve the drug for treatment of the
disease in adults.265 According to the relator, the defendant had
provided him and other sales representatives with training on
off-label uses of Eloxatin and had instructed them on how
Medicare reimbursement for off-label uses of the drug could be
obtained.266 In addition, the relator alleged that the defendant
had induced Wisconsin Physician Services (“WPS”), the Medicare administrator for Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
Michigan, to authorize the use of Eloxatin for the treatment of
colorectal cancer in the first line and adjuvant setting even
though these were off-label uses at the time.267 Finally, the
relator also claimed that the defendant had briefed him and
other sales representatives about off-label uses of Elitek in
adult patients and had encouraged them to promote off-label
uses of the drug.268
In its motion to dismiss, the defendant contended that
the relator failed to allege that it had made any misrepresentations to doctors, the government, or anyone else regarding
Eloxatin. Nor did the relator allege that any doctor had prescribed Eloxatin improperly or that any doctor who had
prescribed Eloxatin had made any misrepresentations to
Medicare in order to obtain reimbursement for off-label uses
of the drug. Furthermore, the relator did not allege that the
information provided by the defendant about off-label uses of
Elitek had been either false or deceitful.269
In the case of Eloxatin, the court acknowledged that
physicians had filed claims for Medicare reimbursement for offlabel uses of the drug.270 The court also agreed that the FCA is
broad enough to impose liability on a drug company who
knowingly assists the government to pay fraudulent claims to a
third person even if the drug company does not have any direct
contractual relations with the government.271 However, the
court cautioned that in order to state a valid claim under the
FCA, the relator must show that the defendant made a
265

Id.
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id. The FDA subsequently approved Eloxatin for treatment of colorectal
cancer in the first line and adjuvant settings after the defendant submitted
supplemental New Drug Applications for these uses. Id.
269
Id. at *4.
270
Id. at *7.
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Id. (citing United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d
39, 48 (D. Mass. 2001)).
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material misrepresentation.272 To satisfy this materiality
requirement, the relator had to allege, with the required
specificity, (1) that the defendant had fraudulently promoted
certain off-label uses of Eloxatin to doctors; (2) that these
doctors had submitted Medicare claims for these off-label uses;
and (3) that these claims had resulted from the defendant’s
promotion of the off-label uses.273 Thus, the relator had to show
that but for the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations, the
doctors would not have made claims to Medicare for off-label
uses of Eloxatin and that but for these fraudulent misrepresentations, Medicare would not have reimbursed the doctors.274
The court concluded that the relator failed to establish
this causal connection. The relator alleged that although
Eloxatin had only been approved for second-line treatment of
fourth stage colorectal cancer, the defendant had encouraged
physicians to submit Medicare claims for other stages of
colorectal cancer.275 The court noted that although the Medicare
reimbursement form did have a line for a patient’s diagnosis, it
did not require doctors to indicate the stage of a patient’s
cancer.276 Therefore, the court concluded that the stage of
cancer was not material to either the doctor’s Medicare
reimbursement claim or to the government’s decision to pay the
claim.277 Thus, the defendant’s conduct had not caused false
claims to be made to the government.
The court then considered whether the relator had
pleaded sufficient evidence of intent as required by the FCA.
The FCA requires that there be “actual knowledge that the
information was untrue or deliberate ignorance or reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of that information” on the part
of the defendant.278 The court determined that the relator did
not allege that the defendant had deliberately lied to either its
sales staff or to the doctors who prescribed Eloxatin. Nor did
the relator claim that the information the defendant had
disseminated about off-label uses was incorrect or false.279
Instead, he merely alleged that the information was
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Hess, 2006 WL 1064127, at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Taber, 342 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir.
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“immature, unreliable and misleading.”280 Nor did the relator
allege that the defendant had assisted doctors to make fraudulent claims. As the court already concluded, the Medicare
reimbursement for off-label uses of Eloxatin had not been
fraudulent because the alleged off-label use was for the
treatment of an earlier stage of colorectal cancer and the
Medicare forms in question did not require doctors to identify
the stage of a patient’s cancer.281 Consequently, the court
concluded that the relator’s complaint failed to satisfy the
FCA’s intent requirement.282
With regard to Elitek, the court found that the only
factual allegations the relator made to support his claim were
that the defendant had informed him and other sales representatives about off-label uses of the drug, had encouraged
them to promote these off-label uses, and had pressured them
to derive a substantial amount of Elitek sales from these offlabel uses.283 However, the court also determined that the
relator’s complaint failed to identify the time or place of the
allegedly false representations regarding Elitek, nor did it
describe the nature or content of the claims that it alleged had
been fraudulent.284 Furthermore, the relator failed to allege
that the doctors to whom the defendant’s sales representatives
promoted off-label uses of Elitek actually had submitted false
claims to the government for such uses.285 Instead, the relator’s
allegations were “vague, conclusory, and lack[ed] the requisite
specificity to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to either
Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 9(b).”286 Accordingly, the court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the relator’s claims regarding
Elitek.
Finally, the court rejected the relator’s argument that
the defendant should be found liable under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(3) of the FCA, which creates liability for persons who
conspire to defraud the government through fraudulent claims
or payments.287 According to the court, to state a claim for
conspiracy:
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
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[A] plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the defendant conspired with one
or more persons to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid by
the United States, and (2) that one or more conspirators performed
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, and (3) that the United
States suffered damages as a result of the false or fraudulent
claim.”288

In this case, the relator did not plead facts suggesting that
physicians had provided fraudulent or false information to
the government or that the defendant had provided such information to the physicians.289 Moreover, the court found that the
relator did not allege any facts indicating that the defendant
had acted in concert with physicians to make false or fraudulent claims to the government.290 Finding that the relator’s
allegation of a conspiracy did not meet the particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b), the court ruled that the conspiracy
claim should be dismissed as well.291 Thus, the court dismissed
the relator’s complaint in its entirety.292
Hess illustrates the challenges plaintiffs face when they
bring qui tam actions against drug companies under the FCA.
In particular, both the materiality requirement and the intent
requirement of the Act present significant obstacles to success.
4. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc.
United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. provides a third
example of how an FCA claim may be brought against a
pharmaceutical company that has promoted off-label uses. The
relator in this case, Dr. Peter Rost, brought a qui tam action
against Pfizer and Pharmacia Corporation, which had been
acquired by Pfizer in 2003, alleging that they had engaged in
illegal off-label marketing of the drug Genotropin and had
knowingly caused false claims to be submitted to federal and
state health insurance programs.293 The alleged fraudulent
conduct had taken place between 1997 and 2003.294 The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
288

Hess, 2006 WL 1064127, at *11 (quoting Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d
1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005)).
289
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United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. (Rost I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8-10 (D.
Mass. 2006), vacated and remanded, Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. (Rost II), 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir.
2007).
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court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the public
disclosure bar and that the claim failed to allege fraud with
sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b).295 The district court
rejected the claim that the public disclosure bar applied,296 but,
like the Hess court, dismissed the relator’s case because his
allegations were not sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)297 On appeal, the First Circuit agreed with
the conclusions of the trial court, but held that the relator
should be given a chance to amend his complaint.298
Genotropin is a recombinant or man-made human
growth hormone that had been approved by the FDA to treat
certain hormonal deficiencies in both adults and children.299
The FDA had not approved the drug as a treatment for short
children without hormonal deficiencies or as an anti-aging
treatment for adults.300 However, the relator alleged that,
beginning in 1997, Pharmacia marketed Genotropin to increase
growth in short children and to delay the aging process in
adults.301 Pharmacia had given bribes, kickbacks, and other
incentives to doctors to prescribe Genotropin and to wholesale
drug distributors to recommend Genotropin for off-label uses.302
The company also had rewarded sales representatives for every
new Genotropin patient, regardless of whether the prescription
was for an approved or an off-label use.303 As a result of these
marketing efforts, approximately sixty percent of adult sales
and twenty-five percent of pediatric sales of Genotropin had
been for off-label uses during this period.304
As manager of Pharmacia’s Endocrine Care Unit, Dr.
Rost had overseen the worldwide marketing of Genotropin, but
had not been involved in the day-to-day marketing or sales of
the drug.305 However, when he learned of Pharmacia’s off-label
marketing of Genotropin, Dr. Rost had unsuccessfully tried to
put a stop to the practices.306 When Pfizer acquired Pharmacia,
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
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it confirmed the relator’s charges and notified senior officials at
the FDA and the Office of the Inspector General about the
off-label marketing.307 In 2003, while the FDA was still
investigating the Genotropin issue, the relator filed a qui tam
action alleging fraud in the off-label marketing of Genotropin
by Pharmacia.308 In late 2005, the DOJ decided not to intervene
in the case, leaving Dr. Rost to proceed on his own.309
The defendant moved to dismiss the claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction based on the FCA’s “public
disclosure bar.”310 In its decision, the trial court declared that it
must determine whether the allegations of fraud in the
complaint were “publicly disclosed” before the relator filed his
lawsuit and whether the allegations were “based upon” that
disclosure.311 The relator argued that the defendants’ voluntary
disclosures had not amounted to a “public disclosure” because
they had not been disclosed in a statutorily required manner.312
The court agreed, finding that the public disclosure bar
prohibited qui tam actions only when the plaintiff’s allegations
were “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media . . . .”313
The court observed that Congress intended the public
disclosure bar to prohibit only truly parasitic lawsuits.314
Actions in which the disclosed information lies only in the
hands of the government and the party who disclosed it to the
government are not parasitic.315 In other words, a qui tam
action is not parasitic when a private plaintiff does not, and
cannot, know what information may already be in the
government’s possession.316 Consequently, the court ruled that
the defendants’ voluntary disclosure of information to various
307

Rost I, 446 F. Supp. 2d. at 10.
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government officials did not constitute a public disclosure for
purposes of the FCA’s jurisdictional bar.317
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed that disclosures
made by Pfizer to the government would not prevent the
relator from bringing his suit against the pharmaceutical
company under the public disclosure bar of the FCA.318
According to the court:
In our view, a “public disclosure” requires that there be some act of
disclosure to the public outside of the government. The mere fact
that the disclosures are contained in government files someplace, or
even that the government is conducting an investigation behind the
scenes, does not itself constitute public disclosure. Our construction
of the term “public disclosure” does not turn on the fact that Pfizer
requested or assumed that its disclosures to the investigating
agencies would be held confidential.319

The appeals court also declared that Pfizer’s position was
“inconsistent with our understanding of the language,
structure, and history of the [False Claims] Act.”320 According
to the court, the FCA’s public disclosure provision was intended
to prevent relators from bringing qui tam actions “based on
information made available to the public during the course of
a government hearing, investigation, or audit.”321 Elaborating
on the distinction between disclosure to the government and
disclosure to the public, the court observed that § 3730 uses the
term “government” many times but never in a sense synonymous with the public.322 Reviewing the FCA’s legislative
history, the court pointed out that the 1986 amendments
removed a provision that barred private lawsuits whenever the
government was aware of the allegations or transactions set
forth in the relator’s complaint.323 The court reasoned that those
amendments reflected Congress’s determination that the
earlier version of § 3730 unduly restricted private enforcement
of the FCA.324
The court rejected the argument that Pfizer’s proposed
government knowledge bar was nevertheless consistent with
317

Id.
Rost II, 507 F.3d 720, 728 (1st Cir. 2007).
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id. at 729 (quoting United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d
17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990)).
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id.
318
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congressional intent because it would only apply in limited
circumstances.325 Relying on a Seventh Circuit case, Pfizer
contended that a government knowledge bar based on § 3730
only applies where the government official to whom the
disclosure is made is the appropriate investigatory official.326
However, the court declared that it could “find no support in
either the language or the history of the statute for such a
reading.”327 Furthermore, the court concluded that Pfizer’s
argument was inconsistent with its opinion in United States ex
rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, which held that
“Congress has explicitly deemed a ‘notice’ regime insufficient to
protect the government against false claims (indeed it was
precisely such a regime that Congress sought to abandon in
enacting the 1986 amendments) . . . .”328
Furthermore, the court declared that Pfizer’s proposed
government knowledge bar would conflict with another
objective embodied in the 1986 amendments: “to help keep the
government honest in its investigations and settlements with
industry.”329 According to the court, once a relator’s allegations
are made public, the government can be forced by public
pressure to pursue false claims investigations that it might
otherwise prefer to ignore.330 However, fewer qui tam actions
would be brought, and thus less information would be made
available to the public, if private qui tam actions were barred
by a government knowledge rule such as that proposed by
Pfizer.
In addition, the court suggested that Pfizer’s proposed
government knowledge rule would not be consistent with
Congress’s goal of discouraging “parasitic” qui tam actions.331
By prohibiting qui tam actions based on information that is
kept confidential by government officials, Pfizer’s interpretation would not only fail to discourage parasitic lawsuits, but
would also discourage legitimate suits by relators based on
“direct and independent knowledge” of wrongdoing.332 Finally,
325

Rost II, 507 F.3d at 730.
Id. (citing United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d
853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999)).
327
Id.
328
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v.
Fleet Bank of Me., 24 F.3d 320, 329 (1st Cir. 1994)).
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Id.
326
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the court observed that several other circuits had rejected
similar constructions of the government knowledge rule.333
The second issue in Rost was whether the relator had
pleaded his claim of fraud with sufficient particularity to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b)—a familiar issue in FCA
litigations.334 The trial court acknowledged that the relator’s
complaint provided a great amount of detail about the
defendants’ illegal marketing, promotion, and distribution of
Genotropin as well as the bribes, kickbacks, and other financial
incentives that the defendants had provided to distributors and
physicians.335 However, the court also found that the complaint
failed to identify any actual false claims that had been
submitted to the government for reimbursement of off-label
prescriptions of Genotropin.336 Instead, the relator had simply
assumed that the defendants’ illegal marketing efforts must
have caused at least some physicians to prescribe Genotropin
for off-label uses and that at least some of these prescriptions
must have been reimbursed by federal or state health care
programs.337 Because the relator failed to plead the existence
of false claims made to the government with sufficient
particularity, the trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant
to Rule 9(b).338
On appeal, Dr. Rost argued that the trial court had
interpreted Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements too strictly.339
In response, Pfizer argued that the result below was mandated
by the First Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Karvelas
v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital.340 The Karvelas court had ruled
that “a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in
lieu of the details of actual false claims in the hope that such
333
Id. (citing Kennard v. Comstock Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir.
2004); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1518 (9th
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) (holding that the 1986 FCA
amendment does not apply retrospectively to prior acts); United States ex rel. Williams
v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1496 n.7 (11th Cir. 1991)). Only the Seventh Circuit, in
United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, has adopted the government
knowledge approach. Id. at 731 (citing Mathews, 166 F.3d at 861). The Rost II court
declared, “We simply disagree with Mathews for the reasons already stated and as
lucidly set forth in the district court’s opinion.” Id.
334
Id. at 731-34.
335
Rost I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
336
Id.
337
Id. at 27-28.
338
Id.
339
Rost II, 507 F.3d at 731.
340
Id. (citing United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360
F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2004)).
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details will emerge through subsequent discovery.”341 The
relator in that case alleged that his employer, a hospital, had
submitted claims to government health care programs for
services that were “provided improperly or not at all.”342 The
court dismissed the relator’s complaint because it provided no
specifics about particular false claims for payments that may
have been made.343 Nevertheless, the Circuit Court in Rost
found that Karvelas provided that the requirements of Rule
9(b) may be satisfied even though some questions remained if
the complaint as a whole is sufficiently particular to fulfill FCA
pleading requirements.344 However, even giving the relator in
Rost the benefit of this flexibility, the court still concluded that
his claim failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule
9(b).345
The court pointed out that, unlike in Karvelas, any false
claims in Rost would have been submitted to the government
by individual doctors and hospitals, not by the defendant,
Pfizer.346 Thus, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the
relator, Dr. Rost, to have had personal knowledge that false
claims had been submitted by third parties. Given the fact that
a substantial percentage of Genotropin prescriptions were
written for off-label uses, it was highly probable that at least
some of these prescriptions had been paid for by federal health
care programs.347 However, the court observed that the relator’s
position was somewhat undermined by a statement in the
criminal information against Pfizer to the effect that most
patients who take the drug for off-label purposes “paid out-ofpocket without reimbursement from any public or private
third-party payors.”348 After taking this offsetting evidence into
account, the court concluded that the allegations contained in
the relator’s complaint did not satisfy the particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b):
At most, Rost raises facts that suggest fraud was possible; but the
complaint contained no factual or statistical evidence to strengthen
the inference of fraud beyond possibility. It may well be that doctors

341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348

Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 231.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 233-35.
Rost II, 507 F.3d at 732 (citing Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 233 n.17).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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who prescribed Genotropin for off-label uses as a result of
Pharmacia’s illegal marketing of the drug withstood the temptation
and did not seek federal reimbursement, and neither did their
patients. It may be that physicians prescribed Genotropin for offlabel uses only where the patients paid for it themselves or when the
patients’ private insurers paid for it. Rost did not plead enough to
satisfy the concerns behind Rule 9(b).349

Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the trial court’s Rule
9(b) ruling.350
Finally, the court considered whether Dr. Rost should be
given an opportunity to amend his complaint in order to satisfy
the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).351 The court
observed that Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend a
pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”352
Refraining from making an initial determination on the futility
of amendment, the court remanded for further consideration on
this issue.353
The Rost case serves as another illustration that the
FCA can be a source of liability for manufacturers that promote
off-label uses. However, relators that wish to bring such claims
may have a tough time meeting the particularity requirement
of Rule 9(b) for alleging fraud.
5. United States ex rel. Richardson v. Bristol-Meyers
Squibb
One of the most recent False Claims Act cases involved
the Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”). In September,
2007, BMS and its wholly-owned subsidiary Apothecon, Inc.,
reached a $515 million dollar settlement with the Department
of Justice.354 The settlement resolved seven qui tam actions
brought against BMS and Apothecon under the FCA.355
According to the government, between the years 2000 and 2003
BMS had paid doctors and other health care providers to

349

Id. at 733.
Id.
351
Id. at 733-34.
352
Id. at 733 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
353
Id. at 734.
354
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay
More Than $515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and
Pricing 1 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/
07_civ_782.html.
355
Id. at 2
350
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purchase BMS pharmaceutical products.356 This illegal remuneration had included payments to physicians and others to
enable them to participate in consulting programs, advisory
boards, and preceptorships, often involving travel to luxury
resorts.357 The government also claimed that BMS had
knowingly promoted Abilify, an anti-psychotic drug, to treat
pediatric patients and to treat dementia-related psychosis in
geriatric patients—both of which were unapproved, off-label
uses.358 The company’s sales representatives had allegedly
urged child psychiatrists and pediatricians to prescribe Abilify
to their patients.359 BMS had also assembled a specialized sales
force that directed its attention almost entirely toward nursing
homes that were likely to have large numbers of patients with
dementia-related psychosis.360
Pursuant to a settlement agreement, the federal government recovered over $320 million, including a $25 million
“disgorgement” of illegal profits arising from BMS’s illegal
promotion of Abilify for off-label uses.361 In addition, BMS was
required to pay $187 million to state Medicaid participants and
$124,000 to certain other public health agencies.362
Although the outcomes of the cases discussed above are
mixed, it is clear that the False Claims Act represents a serious
threat to drug companies that illegally promote off-label uses of
their products. Both relators and the federal government are
aggressively pursuing FCA cases against drug companies, and
some of these companies have been forced to pay hundreds of
millions of dollars in settlements.

356

Id. at 1.
Id.
358
Id. at 2.
359
Id.
360
Id. In addition, the government alleged that BMS and Apothecon had
charged fraudulent and inflated prices for many of its oncology and generic drugs,
knowing that the reimbursement rates provided by federal health care programs would
be based on these higher prices. Id. Finally, the government charged that BMS had
knowingly misreported its best price for the anti-depression drug Serzone by failing to
include in its calculations lower-priced sales of the drug to a large commercial
purchaser. Id. This action caused Medicaid and other public health providers, who
were entitled to purchase drugs at the manufacturer’s “best price,” to pay more for
these products than they would have if BMS’s best price information had been
accurate. Id.
361
Id.
362
Id. Finally, BMS agreed to sign a corporate integrity agreement with the
Department of Health and Human Services that requires it to report accurate average
sales prices and average manufacturer prices for all of its products that are covered by
Medicare or other federal health care programs.
357
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TORT LIABILITY FOR PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES

Tort liability is the final pitfall for drug and medical
device manufacturers that encourage physicians to make offlabel uses of their products. Of course, drug manufacturers are
subject to liability for product-related injuries when their
products are used for their intended purposes if they are
defectively manufactured or designed or when the warnings
provided are inadequate.363 However, additional theories of tort
liability may be available to plaintiffs when they are injured by
off-label uses of prescription drugs or medical devices. This
portion of the Article examines four tort-based claims:
(1) claims based on violations of the FDCA, including fraud-onthe-FDA and negligence per se claims, (2) claims arising from
fraudulent misrepresentation and improper marketing practices, (3) claims based on failure to warn, and (4) claims based
on failure to test.
A.

Tort Claims Based on Violations of the FDCA

Plaintiffs are increasingly basing their claims against
producers of drugs and medical devices on alleged violations of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act or regulations promulgated
by the FDA pursuant to the Act.364 At first, plaintiffs had often
alleged that the defendants were guilty of “fraud-on-theFDA.” However, more recently, they have tended to argue that
violations of the FDCA constitute “negligence per se.”
1. Fraud on the FDA
There is general agreement that the FDCA does not
authorize lawsuits by private individuals to enforce its provisions.365 Nevertheless, during the 1990s, a number of lawsuits

363

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAB. § 6 (1998).
James M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCABased Causes of Action in the Tort Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 389, 389 (2000).
365
See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bone Screw I),
159 F.3d 817, 824 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531
U.S. 341 (2001); PDK Labs., Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1113 (2d Cir. 1997);
Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967-68 (6th Cir. 1995); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7
F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993); Pacific Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367, 37071 (7th Cir. 1976); Griffin v. O’Neal, Jones & Feldman, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D.
Ohio 1985); Nat’l Women’s Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robins Co., 545 F. Supp. 1177,
1178 (D. Mass. 1980); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 490 F. Supp. 479, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
364
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were brought against the manufacturers of various spinal
fixation implant devices366 alleging that these manufacturers
had lied to the FDA in order to obtain permission to market
their products.367 Specifically, these plaintiffs contended that
the manufacturers of fixation implant devices had assured the
FDA that their devices would be marketed for bone surgeries
and other approved uses when in fact the manufacturers had
intended to market them for an off-label use as pedicle spinal
implant devices.368 The plaintiffs claimed that by making these
false assurances to the FDA, the manufacturers had been
able to obtain approval for these devices under the premarket
notification process369 instead of the more lengthy and
366
In spinal fusion surgery, bone graft material, usually taken from the
patient’s hipbone, is inserted between two vertebrae to create a single immobile block
to reduce the pain caused when vertebrae move in different directions. Valente v.
Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1999). The rods are be attached to
vertebrae by spine-hooks, wires, or metal screws (known as bone screws) that are
inserted into the pedicles of neighboring vertebrae and connected to rods or plates to
reduce movement between these vertebrae. Cali v. Danek Med., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d
941, 945 (W.D. Wis. 1998). If the spinal fusion surgery is successful, the bone graft and
the vertebrae fuse together to form a single bony mass. Minisan v. Danek Med., Inc., 79
F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (N.D. Ind. 1999). Once this occurs, the spinal fixation device can
be removed. Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817, 822 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
Pedicles are two rearward facing bony arches on either side of the vertebrae that
support the lamina. Minisan, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 972 n.1.
Various types of bone screw fixation devices have been the subject of
litigation. These include AcroMed’s Variable Screw Placement (“VSP”) Device (Bone
Screw I, 159 F.3d at 821; Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1995);
Dutton v. AcroMed Corp., 691 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)); Artifex’s HBH
Spinal System (Sharp v. Artifex, Ltd., 110 F. Supp. 2d 388, 389 (W.D. Pa. 1999));
Danek’s Texas Scottish Rite Hospital (“TSRH”) Spinal System Device (Minisan, 79 F.
Supp. at 972; Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 249-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1999);
King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); Danek’s DynaLok Device (Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1999)); Danek’s
Luque System (Cali, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 946); Smith & Nephew Richards’s Rogozinski
System (Blinn v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (M.D. Fla.
1999)); and Sofamor’s Cotrel Dubousset System (Smith v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 21 F. Supp.
2d 918, 919 (W.D. Wis. 1998)).
367
Bone Screw I, 159 F.3d at 820; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 303-04; Dutton, 691
N.E.2d at 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); see also Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216,
232-33 (6th Cir. 2000) (cardiac pacemaker).
368
Bone Screw I, 159 F.3d at 820; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 306; Dutton, 691 N.E.2d
at 740.
369
The Medical Device Amendments provide that medical devices that are
“substantially equivalent” to an existing approved device can secure marketing
authorization from the FDA through a premarket notification, or § 510(k), process. 21
U.S.C. 360(k)-(o) (2006); U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Premarket Notification 510(K),
http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/DEVADVICE/314.html. For a discussion of the premarket
notification process, see Richard C. Ausness, “After You, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should
the Courts Defer to the FDA’s New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device
Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV. 727, 733 (2006); see also Trent Kirk, Comment, Fraudon-the-FDA & Buckman—The Evolving Law of Federal Preemption in Products
Liability Litigation, 53 S.C. L. REV. 673, 681 (2002).
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expensive premarket approval procedure (“PMA”).370 Under the
fraud-on-the-FDA theory, the devices in question would never
have been marketed in the absence of this fraud and therefore
the manufacturers should be liable for any resulting injuries,
even though the plaintiffs could not prove that the devices were
defective.371
Until 2001, there was a split of authority over whether
fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted by the Medical
Device Amendments to the FDCA.372 The U.S. Supreme Court
resolved this conflict in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Committee.373 The plaintiffs in Buckman contended that they
had been injured by surgical bone screws manufactured by
AcroMed Corporation.374 They alleged that the manufacturer
and its consultant, the Buckman Company, had obtained FDA
approval to market the screws as “substantially equivalent”
devices by claiming that they would be used in the long bones
of the arms and legs when the company actually had intended
to market them principally for use in spinal fusion surgery.375
The Buckman Court held that the plaintiffs’ fraud-onthe-agency claims were impliedly preempted by the Medical
Device Amendments.376 According to the Court, a conflict exists
between common-law tort claims like the plaintiffs’ and the
FDA’s need to balance a number of competing regulatory
objectives.377 One such objective is to protect the integrity of the
licensing process. Section 510(k)’s disclosure requirements help
achieve this objective, as do the wide range of enforcement
options available to the FDA to detect and punish fraudulent

370

For a discussion of the PMA procedure, see Sasha B. Rieders, Note, State
Law Tort Claims and the FDA: Proposing a Consumer-Oriented Prescription in Medical
Device Cases, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1159, 1167-71 (2004).
371
It is not known whether any of these plaintiffs ultimately prevailed.
However, one court stated, “No federal court has resolved this question in favor of the
plaintiff’s claim.” Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967 (6th cir. 1995).
372
Kemp, 231 F.3d 233-36 (holding that fraud-on-the-FDA claims are
expressly preempted by the MDA); Bone Screw I, 159 F.3d at 823-25 (refusing to hold
that such claims were preempted); Reeves, 44 F.3d at 302 (holding that such claims
were preempted). For a discussion the FDA’s marketing approval process under the
MDA, see supra text accompanying notes 33-44.
373
531 U.S. 341 (2001).
374
Id. at 343.
375
Id. at 346.
376
Id. at 348.
377
Id.
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applications.378 However, the FDA also must ensure that its
licensing process does not slow down the introduction of new
medical products into the market or interfere with the
judgment of health care professionals.379 In particular, the
Court observed that allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims would
discourage off-label uses because drug companies would be
concerned with potential tort liability.380 Finally, the Court
emphasized that the claims involved were not ordinary tort
claims, but instead were based entirely on noncompliance
with FDA disclosure requirements.381 The Buckman decision
effectively shut down fraud-on-the-FDA claims. Enterprising
plaintiffs’ lawyers quickly shifted from this theory to a thinly
disguised substitute known as negligence per se.
2. Violations of the FDCA as Negligence Per Se
Under the principle of negligence per se, a court relies
upon a statute or administrative regulation to define the
standard of care in a negligence action.382 By successfully
invoking negligence per se, the plaintiff establishes as a matter
of law that the defendant’s conduct was negligent so that the
plaintiff need only prove causation and damages in order to
prevail.383 Plaintiffs have argued that manufacturers of pharmaceutical products and medical devices who violate the FDCA
or FDA regulations are negligent and subject to civil liability
under state negligence per se doctrines for any injuries that
are proximately caused by such violations. In general, most
courts have declined to embrace this application of negligence

378
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348-49. Even the less rigorous premarket notification requirements under § 510(k) require applicants to provide the FDA with
information about the device’s design and function. Id. at 345-46.
379
Id. at 349-50.
380
Id. at 350.
381
Id. at 352-53.
382
Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical
Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51, 54 (2005).
383
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bone Screw II), 193 F.3d
781, 790 (3d Cir. 1999); In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1118 (3d Cir. 1995).
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per se.384 Other courts have rejected negligence per se claims
because the plaintiff was unable to prove causation.385
Talley v. Danek Medical, Inc. reflects the reasoning of
those courts that have refused to apply the doctrine of
negligence per se to claims based on alleged violations of the
FDCA.386 In that case, medical device manufacturer Danek had
secured FDA approval for the Dyna-Lok Device, a pedicle screw
fixation device,387 as a Class II device, which would not require
premarket approval from the FDA,388 although at that time
such devices had been classified as Class III devices, which
would require premarket approval through the PMA process
before being marketed for pedicle screw fixation.389 The
plaintiff, Janet Talley, had undergone a number of unsuccessful back surgeries in which the Dyna-Lok Device was
attached to the pedicles of her spine. Danek had not sought
premarket approval for the Dyna-Lok Device at the time of
Talley’s operations.390 After suffering injuries and complications
from the surgeries, Talley sued Danek, maintaining that the
company had deliberately marketed the Dyna-Lok Device for a
use that had not been approved by the FDA in violation of the
FDCA and that the company had therefore been negligent as a
matter of law.391 Unlike the fraud-on-the-FDA cases, in which
the plaintiffs focused their allegations on an unauthorized
presence of off-label uses in the market, Talley argued that it
was the promotion of the Dyna-Lok Device for off-label uses,
rather than its mere presence in the market, that had caused
her injuries.392 The lower court granted the defendant’s motion
384

Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d at 792; Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154,
161 (4th Cir. 1999); Sharp v. Artifex, Ltd., 110 F. Supp. 2d 388, 394-95 (W.D. Pa. 1999);
Baker v. Danek Medical, 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); King v. Danek Med.,
Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Cali v. Danek Med., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d
941, 954 (W.D. Wis. 1998). But see Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553,
558-59 (3d Cir. 1983).
385
Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817, 829 (N.D. Ind. 1999);
Minisan v. Danek Med., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975-77 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Sita v.
Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Valente v. Sofamor,
S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876-77 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Baker v. Danek Medical, Inc., 35
F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 88, 94
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1998).
386
Talley, 179 F.3d at 160-61.
387
See supra note 366.
388
Talley, 179 F.3d at 160.
389
Id.
390
Id.
391
Id. at 160.
392
Id.
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for summary judgment, concluding that Talley had failed to
show any evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff appealed.393
On appeal, the plaintiff in Talley renewed her claim
that Danek had violated the FDCA by marketing a surgical
device for a use that had not been approved by the FDA.394 In
particular, the plaintiff argued that “while purportedly selling
the Dyna-Lok Device for its Class II purpose, Danek was in fact
marketing the device for the unapproved Class III purpose of
use in the pedicles of the spine . . . .”395 According to the
plaintiff, this alleged violation of the FDCA supported a claim
based on negligence per se.396 However, the court observed that
the doctrine of negligence per se does not automatically create
a private cause of action for every violation of a statute.397 In
the first place, not all statutory provisions establish a standard
of care, and therefore not all statutory violations provide a
basis for applying the doctrine of negligence per se.398 In
addition, even when a statute does establish a standard of care,
the plaintiff must also prove the additional elements of
negligence, including duty, causation, and injury.399
Addressing the standard of care issue, the court
declared that violation of a statute that does not define a standard of care but merely imposes an administrative requirement
will not support a negligence per se claim.400 According to the
court, licensing and reporting requirements, even when they
are part of a regulatory scheme that is designed to protect
public safety, are statutory requirements that do not establish
a standard of care.401 Applying this principle to the FDA’s
licensing requirements, the court concluded that the general
requirement that drugs and medical devices receive FDA
approval before marketing was “only a tool to facilitate
administration of the underlying regulatory scheme” and did
not embody any substantive standard of care.402 Consequently,
even if Danek had failed to comply with the FDA’s licensing

393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402

Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. Va. 1998).
Talley, 179 F.3d at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161.
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requirements, this by itself would not support a negligence per
se claim.403
Moreover, as previously noted, the court held that even
if the doctrine of negligence per se were applicable, the plaintiff
would still be required to prove the other elements of a
negligence claim.404 In this case, the court determined that the
plaintiff failed to present any evidence that Danek’s failure to
obtain proper FDA approval for the Dyna-Lok Device had
caused her injuries.405 Indeed, as the court pointed out, the
FDA’s subsequent approval of pedicle screw fixation devices as
Class II devices suitable for spinal fusion surgery indicated
that the agency thought that bone screw devices such as the
defendant’s product could be safely used for this purpose.406 Nor
was there any evidence that the plaintiff’s doctor would have
chosen some other device if he had known that the FDA had
not approved the Dyna-Lok Device for spinal fusion surgery at
the time of the plaintiff’s operation.407 Consequently, the court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant’s alleged violation of the statute had proximately
caused her injuries and therefore upheld the lower court’s
dismissal of her negligence per se claim.408
A Tennessee appeals court in King v. Danek Medical,
Inc. agreed with the Talley court’s reasoning.409 Like Talley,
King involved a negligence per se claim against the manufacturer of the TSRH device, a pedicle screw spinal fixation
mechanism similar to Danek’s Dyna-Lok device.410 Danek had
obtained an Investigational Device Exemption to conduct
clinical trials on its TSRH Device.411 However, according to the
plaintiffs, while these clinical trials were going on, Danek had
promoted the device for use in spinal pedicle surgery “[o]n a
massive and perhaps unprecedented basis,” thereby violating
various provisions of the FDCA.412 On appeal from the trial
court’s dismissal of their claim, the plaintiffs argued that
marketing a surgical device that had not received premarket
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412

Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 455. See supra note 39 for an explanation of the IDE process.
Id.
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approval from the FDA violated the FDCA and constituted
negligence per se.413 Quoting Talley, the appellate court
declared that the requirement of FDA approval prior to
marketing is “only a tool to facilitate administration of the
underlying regulatory scheme.”414 Furthermore, because the
approval requirement lacks any “independent substantive
content,” it does not embody a standard of care.415 The court
concluded that breach of this requirement is akin to driving
without a driver’s license and provides no basis for a negligence
per se claim.416 Consequently, the King court affirmed the lower
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim.417
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation presents an interesting variation on the negligence per
se argument because the case involved conspiracy claims.418
This multidistrict litigation involved more than 2000 lawsuits
and approximately 5000 individual plaintiffs.419 The plaintiffs
alleged that several conspiracies existed on the part of bone
screw manufacturers and others to promote their orthopedic
bone screw products in violation of FDA regulations.420
The plaintiffs first claimed that individual bone screw
manufacturers had agreed to give royalties and stock options to
orthopedic surgeons and other physicians in return for their
participation in seminars that were held apparently to inform
physicians about the medical uses of bone screw devices.421
According to the plaintiffs, the real purpose of these seminars
was to promote the bone screw manufacturer’s products.422 In
addition, the physicians who conducted these seminars had
failed to inform their audiences that the bone screw devices
they were promoting had not received FDA approval for use in
pedicle fixation surgery and that clinical trials had actually
413

King, 37 S.W.3d at 455.
Id. at 457.
415
Id.
416
Id.
417
Id. at 460.
418
Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Cali v. Danek Med.,
Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (alleging a conspiracy among bone screw
manufacturers to promote an off-label use of their products). For a discussion of the use
of civil conspiracy theories in products liability litigation, see Richard C. Ausness,
Conspiracy Theories: Is There a Place for Civil Conspiracy in Products Liability
Litigation?, 74 TENN. L. REV. 383 (2007).
419
Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d at 784.
420
Id. at 786-87.
421
Id. at 786.
422
Id.
414
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raised serious concerns about the safety and effectiveness of
bone screw devices when used in this manner.423 Furthermore,
seminar speakers had not disclosed that they had a financial
interest in promoting this form of off-label use.424
The plaintiffs’ second civil conspiracy claim alleged that
bone screw device manufacturers had paid various professional
associations to sponsor and present seminars for orthopedic
surgeons in order to promote the use of bone screws in spinal
fixation surgery.425 As in the previous conspiracy claim, the
plaintiffs declared that the conspirators had concealed that the
FDA had not approved the use of bone screws in pedicle
fixation surgery, that studies had revealed problems with this
procedure, and that the professional associations had been paid
to promote the off-label use of these devices.426 The plaintiffs
also claimed that a trade association established by the
conspirators had conducted a fraudulent study to use in civil
litigation and that certain conspirators, in order to obtain
§ 510(k) clearance for their products as substantially equivalent devices, had falsely told the FDA that one company had
marketed a bone screw device for pedicle fixation surgery prior
to 1976.427
The lower court dismissed these claims, holding that an
independent basis of liability was necessary to bring a civil
conspiracy claim and that violation of the FDCA did not satisfy
this requirement.428 On appeal, the Third Circuit observed that
there is no private right of action for violations of the FDCA.429
The court also agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that one
cannot sue a group of defendants for conspiring to engage in
conduct that would not be actionable against an individual
defendant.430 Because the plaintiffs could not sue individual
defendants for violations of the FDCA, they could not sue them
for conspiring to engage in conduct that violates the FDCA
either.431
The plaintiffs also argued that violations of federal
statutes could be the basis of common law liability under the
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431

Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 789-90.
Id.
Id.
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principle of negligence per se and thereby provide the underlying tort necessary to support a civil conspiracy claim.432 The
appeals court, however, responded that negligence per se did
not create an independent basis of tort liability, but merely
established a standard of care for an underlying tort.433 In the
court’s view, the plaintiffs’ bootstrapping interpretation of
negligence per se “would allow private plaintiffs to recover for
violations of a federal statute that creates no private cause of
action and, in fact, expressly restricts its enforcement to the
federal government.”434 If the plaintiffs were allowed to prevail,
they could sidestep the FDCA’s prohibition against private
enforcement actions merely by bringing a civil conspiracy
action instead of suing defendants for individual actions.435 For
this reason, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ conspiracy
claims were properly dismissed.436
As mentioned earlier, a number of courts have also
rejected negligence per se claims on causation grounds.437
Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc. is illustrative of this approach.438
This case also involved the marketing of orthopedic bone screw
devices for use in spinal fusion therapy.439 The plaintiff alleged
that, because the pedicle screw device did not have FDA
approval for implantation into the vertebral pedicle, Depuy
Motech was prohibited from marketing it for use in spinal
fixation surgery and had a duty to regulate the use of its
devices in hospitals.440 According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s violation of FDA regulations constituted negligence per
se.441 In response to a motion for summary judgment by the
defendant, the court acknowledged that Wisconsin law would
permit the plaintiff to base his negligence per se claim on
violation of the FDCA.442 However, the court ultimately granted
the defendant’s summary judgment motion, finding that the
plaintiff had not produced any medical evidence that his
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442

1999)).

Bone Screw II, 193 F.3d at 790.
Id.
Id. at 791.
Id.
Id. at 792.
See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
Id. at 820.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 829.
Id. (citing Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876 (E.D. Wis.
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doctor’s use of the defendant’s device was a proximate cause of
his injury.443
B.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

In addition to basing tort claims on violations of the
FDCA, injured consumers have also sued drug and medical
device manufacturers for fraudulent misrepresentation.444 A
fraudulent misrepresentation claim requires proof by clear and
convincing evidence of the following elements:
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand;
(3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to
whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another
into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation;
and (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the
reliance.445

Fraudulent misrepresentation claims in this area have often
failed because plaintiffs were unable to establish either
reliance or causation.446
Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Division) is illustrative of
the difficulties plaintiffs face when they base their claim on
fraudulent misrepresentation.447 The plaintiffs in Miller sued
Pfizer in federal court after its anti-depression drug, Zoloft,
allegedly caused their thirteen-year-old son, Matthew, to
commit suicide.448 The plaintiffs sought to hold Pfizer strictly
liable for marketing defects and misrepresentations about
Zoloft.449 Pfizer moved for partial summary judgment on the
defective marketing and failure-to-warn claims.450

443

Id.
See, e.g., McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 461 (W.D.
Va. 2004) (OxyContin); Wethington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 218 F.R.D. 577, 582 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (OxyContin); Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 88, 95 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (spinal fixation device); Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1998) (spinal fixation device).
445
Ausness, supra note 418, at 400 (quoting Goldstein v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
854 A.2d 585, 590-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)).
446
Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 161 (4th Cir. 1999); McCauley,
331 F. Supp. 2d at 462; Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); Baker v. Danek Med., 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Osburn, 520
S.E.2d at 95; Harden, 985 S.W.2d at 453.
447
Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Div.), 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Kan. 2002).
448
Id. at 1097.
449
Id. In addition, the complaint set forth a negligence claim based on the
defendant’s failure to test and warn about the risk of drug-induced suicide when Zoloft
was prescribed off-label for children. Id.
450
Id.
444
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With respect to their “defective marketing claim,” the
plaintiffs contended that Pfizer had “gone to great lengths to
reassure doctors that the violence and suicide problems that
they ha[d] heard about, mainly with its chief SSRI competitor
Prozac, would not occur with Zoloft, and to assuage patient’s
[sic] concerns over the initial adverse effects which are
frequently the harbingers of tragedy . . . .”451 As evidence of this
marketing scheme, the plaintiffs relied on statements made
by a Pfizer employee, James Lee Jung.452 Mr. Jung had told
the defendant’s professional medical representatives not to
mention the risk of suicide from Zoloft to physicians unless
they specifically asked about it.453 In addition, Jung had told
the representatives that if they were asked about suicide risk,
they should assure physicians that Zoloft had a low risk of
suicide ideation.454
Since the plaintiffs did not set forth any specific legal
basis for their marketing defect claim, the court chose to
characterize it as a fraud or misrepresentation claim.455 The
court pointed out that to sustain such a claim, plaintiffs must
prove, inter alia, that they “reasonably relied and acted on
the [defendant’s] allegedly false representations to their
detriment.”456 There apparently was no evidence that the
plaintiffs had relied on any representations made by Pfizer;
instead, the court concluded, “In allowing Matthew to use
Zoloft, plaintiffs relied solely on Dr. Geenens’s [Matthew’s
physician] advice.”457
According to Pfizer, even if the plaintiffs could show
reliance on their part, the learned intermediary doctrine
required them to prove that Dr. Geenens had relied on
marketing materials or other information about Zoloft that
Pfizer had provided him.458 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Dr.
Geenens steadfastly maintained that his decision to prescribe
Zoloft to treat Matthew’s depression had not been influenced by
451

Id. at 1119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 1100 n.7.
453
Id.
454
Id.
455
Id. at 1119.
456
Id.
457
Id. at 1099.
458
Id. at 1120. The learned intermediary doctrine provides that a manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn about a prescription drug’s inherent risks without
warning the patient directly when it adequately warns the prescribing physician. See
infra text accompanying notes 513-517.
452
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Pfizer’s advertising or promotional materials.459 Furthermore,
Dr. Geenens testified that Pfizer’s sales representatives had
never encouraged him to prescribe Zoloft for any off-label
uses.460 In response, the plaintiffs argued that the Kansas
Supreme Court, in Hurlbut v. Conoco, Inc.,461 had eliminated
the reliance requirement in misrepresentation cases involving
products.462 However the court rejected their interpretation
of Hurlbut.463 The plaintiffs also urged the court to adopt
the position stated in Section 9 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability,464 which would impose liability on
product manufacturers for even innocent misrepresentations
of material facts.465 The court noted that even under Section 9
of the Restatement, proof of causation is required and if the
plaintiffs could not establish reliance, they could not establish
causation either.466 The plaintiffs also asked the court to reject
the learned intermediary doctrine, thereby relieving them of
the burden of proving reliance on Dr. Geenens’s part.467
However, the court concluded that there was no evidence to
show that Kansas courts had rejected the learned intermediary
doctrine or were about to do so.468
The plaintiffs’ final argument was that Pfizer’s marketing campaign for Zoloft relied on subtle and subliminal
techniques to persuade physicians like Dr. Geenens to
prescribe Zoloft. The plaintiffs maintained that Dr. Geenens
could have been influenced by these subliminal messages to
prescribe Zoloft to Matthew.469 According to this argument, the
reliance requirement for misrepresentation would be satisfied
even though Dr. Geenens denied that he had relied on any
representations about the safety of Zoloft provided by Pfizer.
However, the court ultimately concluded that even if Pfizer
had employed subliminal advertising techniques, the plaintiffs
failed to show that they had any effect on Dr. Geenens’s

459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469

Miller, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
Id.
856 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Kan. 1993).
Miller, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAB. § 9 (1998).
Miller, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
Id.
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decision to prescribe Zoloft to their son.470 Consequently, the
court granted the defendant’s request for summary judgment
on the marketing defect and misrepresentation claims.471
Thus, as Miller illustrates, although misrepresentation
claims are available in theory to plaintiffs seeking recovery
from pharmaceutical companies that promote off-label uses, in
reality this cause of action does not pose a serious threat to
drug manufacturers because of the difficulties in making out a
case.
C.

Failure to Warn

Product sellers, including manufacturers of drugs and
medical devices, have a duty to warn about the inherent risks
associated with the use of their products when the risks may
not be obvious to consumers. Some cases are concerned with
whether a manufacturer must warn about risks that are
unique to particular off-label uses of the product. Another
group of cases have considered what role the learned
intermediary rule plays when a product is used for an off-label
purpose.
1. Failure to Warn About Risks Associated with
Particular Off-Label Uses
A manufacturer has a duty to provide an adequate
warning of any danger inherent in the normal use of its
product that is not likely to be within the knowledge of the
ordinary user.472 In some cases, this duty may require a drug
manufacturer to warn physicians about the risks of particular
off-label uses. For example, in Knowlton v. Deseret Medical,
Inc., the manufacturer of a catheter and needle placement unit
known as Intracath was held liable for chemical burns suffered
by the plaintiff during open-heart surgery.473 The plaintiff’s
surgery involved a procedure known as retrograde threading,
in which two small hollow flexible tubes, or catheters, are
inserted into the left and right atria of the heart.474 The
470

Id. at 1122-23.
Id. at 1123.
472
See, e.g., Winterrowd v. Travelers Indem. Co., 462 So. 2d 639, 642 (La.
1985); Hebert v. Brazzel, 403 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (La. 1981).
473
Knowlton v. Deseret Med., Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 117 (1st Cir. 1991).
474
Id. Retrograde threading involves the insertion of one end of a catheter
into the right atrium and the threading of the other end into a hollow needle with
471
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catheter in Knowlton was used to transmit the drug Nitroprusside (Nipride) to the patient’s heart.475 Some of the Nipride
solution leaked from a cut or hole in the catheter into the
plaintiff’s chest and abdominal walls, causing severe chemical
burns.476
At trial, the jury found that the manufacturer had failed
to adequately warn physicians of the danger inherent in the
use of the Intracath device.477 On appeal, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals observed that the Intracath device was
intended for use in venipunctures—the insertion of the needle
and catheter into a vein.478 However, there was testimony that
the manufacturer had been aware that the use of its catheters
and needles as atrial lines during open-heart surgery was a
common off-label procedure.479 Furthermore, company officials
had acknowledged that they knew there was a significant risk
that the catheter tube might be cut or nicked by the needle if
retrograde threading were employed.480 The appeals court also
noted that a cut or nick sufficient to create a hole in the
catheter would be invisible to the naked eye and, thus, unlikely
to be discovered by the operating surgeon.481 Finally, the court
found that a warning was appropriate because a reasonably
prudent heart surgeon would not be aware of the danger
inherent in the retrograde threading procedure.482 Consequently, the court concluded that the jury verdict was correct
and upheld the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim against the
defendant.483
An Illinois appellate court reached a similar result in
Proctor v. Davis.484 Proctor concerned the Upjohn Company’s
1959 FDA approval to market the anti-inflammatory drug
Depo-Medrol for intramuscular (in the muscle), intra-articular
(in the joint), and intralesional (in a lesion) injections.485 Deposharp beveled edges that is inserted into the chest wall. Id. at 118. The needle and
catheter are then pulled back through the chest wall and the needle removed so that
the catheter can be used as a drug delivery device. Id.
475
Id.
476
Id.
477
Id. at 118-19.
478
Id. at 119.
479
Id.
480
Id.
481
Id. at 122.
482
Id.
483
Id. at 122-23.
484
682 N.E.2d 1203, 1215 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997).
485
Id. at 1206.
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Medrol was a sterile, aqueous suspension containing methyl
prednisone acetate, a corticosteroid, and was useful in treating
various inflammatory bodily disorders.486 Depo-Medrol was an
insoluble toxic material that was intended to be released in the
patient’s body over a period of six to eight weeks and ultimately
carried away in the bloodstream.487
Shortly after the FDA approved the drug, two ophthalmologists independently contacted Upjohn about using DepoMedrol clinically to treat ophthalmic conditions by means of
periocular (near the eye) injections. Upjohn encouraged the
doctors and provided them with a supply of the drug for
their proposed use, but failed to inform them that no animal
studies had been performed to test the drug’s effect on
periocular tissue.488 Subsequently, in the early 1960s, Upjohn
also provided financial support to doctors who used DepoMedrol for unapproved subconjunctival injections.489 Furthermore, the drug company also distributed an article about
off-label uses of the drug, but failed to provide information
about “unsatisfactory” animal experiments that the author had
conducted.490 As periocular injection of Depo-Medrol became
increasingly popular,491 partly due to Upjohn’s marketing
efforts, the company considered submitting a supplemental
New Drug Application for this use to the FDA, but decided not
to do so.492 In fact, periocular injection of Depo-Medrol was
quite risky because if the physician inadvertently injected the
drug into the patient’s eye, it would remain in the eye for a
long time and cause serious injury because the eye does not
possess a blood supply to enable it to remove the drug.493
Moreover, because Depo-Medrol was insoluble, it increased
pressure within the eye and caused other damage.494
In 1983, the plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Davis, began a
program of periocular injections of Depo-Medrol to treat vision
problems associated with cystoid macular edema.495 During one
of these treatments, Dr. Davis mistakenly injected Depo486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495

Proctor, 682 N.E.2d at 1206.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1206
Id.
Id. at 1210.
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Medrol directly into the plaintiff’s left eye.496 Despite a series of
subsequent operations to remove the drug and repair the
damage to his left eye, the plaintiff eventually lost all vision in
the eye and his physicians were forced to remove it.497 The
plaintiff filed suit in 1984 against Dr. Davis and Upjohn,
alleging malpractice against the doctor and claiming that
Upjohn had failed to warn doctors about the dangers of using
Depo-Medrol for off-label periocular injection.498 The jury found
in favor of Dr. Davis, but subjected Upjohn to liability for
compensatory and punitive damages.499
On appeal, the Illinois appellate court declared that a
drug manufacturer has a continuing duty to warn of productrelated risks that are not generally known to the medical
community.500 According to the court, when the manufacturer of
a potentially harmful product possesses information not
generally known to prescribing physicians, it has a duty to
share this information with them by means of warnings.501 In
this case, the record showed that at the time of the operation
Upjohn was aware of the risks associated with periocular
injection of Depo-Medrol and was also aware that many
ophthalmologists were administering the drug in this fashion
as an off-label use.502 Consequently, Upjohn had a legal
obligation to warn about the risks of periocular injection of
Depo-Medrol, and its failure to do so made the drug defective
and unreasonably dangerous.503
Knowlton and Proctor suggest that most courts will
probably uphold failure-to-warn claims if the risks associated
with a particular off-label use is serious, the use is common or
widespread, and if the manufacturer knows of the off-label use
or has encouraged it.504 On the other hand, drug companies
ordinarily have no duty to warn of off-label uses that are
unforeseeable. In Rhoto v. Ribando, a self-proclaimed weight
reduction specialist prescribed a regime of prescription
medications, along with a conservative diet plan, to help the

496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1213.
Noah, supra note 7, at 161-62.
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plaintiff lose weight.505 After following this weight-loss program
for two weeks, the plaintiff suffered a massive stroke.506 In her
suit against the drug manufacturers, the plaintiff argued that
they had failed to warn of the danger of a stroke when various
drugs were used individually or in combination with other
drugs prescribed in connection with her weight reduction
program.507 At the conclusion of the trial, the court directed a
verdict for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff’s
doctor grossly misused the drugs.508
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the warnings for
the individual drugs were inadequate because they did not
warn about the dangers associated with using them in weight
control programs, a practice that the manufacturers knew or
should have known was taking place.509 The court, however,
observed that all of the expert witnesses at trial testified that
the prescription of the particular combination of drugs used in
the plaintiff’s diet plan was a gross misuse of the products.510
The court declared that a manufacturer is only required to
warn of dangers associated with the normal use of its product
and concluded that the warnings provided by the drug
manufacturers in this case satisfied this requirement.511
Consequently, it affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of
the defendants.512
2. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine as a Defense to
Failure-to-Warn Claims
The learned intermediary rule is a substantial barrier to
recovery for plaintiffs who bring failure-to-warn claims. As
noted above, as a general rule, manufacturers have a duty to
warn the ultimate users or consumers of their products about
the inherent risks of those products when the risks may not be
obvious. However, an exception to the general rule, known at
the “learned intermediary doctrine,” applies to prescription

505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512

Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. at 1123-24.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1124-26.
Id. at 1126.
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drugs and medical devices.513 The learned intermediary rule
provides that the manufacturer of a prescription drug or
medical device is only required to warn a patient’s prescribing
physician and does not have to warn the patient directly.514
This rule gets its name from the fact that the physician is
expected to act as an informed intermediary between the
manufacturer and the patient.515 Thus, the manufacturer may
be held liable for injuries caused by the defective prescription
of a product if the manufacturer fails to provide an effective
warning to the prescribing physician.516 On the other hand, if a
manufacturer provides an adequate warning to the prescribing
physician, the manufacturer is not subject to liability, and the
physician has a duty to pass this information on to the
patient.517 However, a plaintiff cannot prevail on a failure-towarn theory against a manufacturer even when the defendant’s
warning is inadequate if the learned intermediary (the
physician) was already aware of the risk at the time of
prescription. In effect, the defendant’s failure to warn is not
regarded as a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury. Drug
manufacturers have often successfully invoked this principle in
off-label use cases.
Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc. illustrates this principle. In
that case, a plaintiff who underwent spinal fixation surgery
sustained injuries when the defendant’s bone screw device, the
TSRH System, fractured.518 In a suit against the manufacturer,
the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the warnings in the
product’s package insert had not been adequate.519 The plaintiff
contended that although the package insert had warned about
such risks as pseudarthrosis, breakage, neurological impairment, and pain, it should have also disclosed that the TSRH
513
See Yonni D. Fushman, Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc: Toward
Creating a Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2000).
514
Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to
Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
97, 106-07 (2002).
515
Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (E.D. Mich. 1991);
Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1993).
516
See Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1228 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979).
517
See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984). This is
an aspect of a physician’s obligation to inform patients of the risks associated with a
particular treatment under the doctrine of informed consent. See generally Peter H.
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994)
518
Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
519
Id. at 259.
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Device had not been approved for pedicle implantation.520
According to the plaintiff,
due to the boiler-plate nature of the language used and the
warning’s failure to state that certain components of the TSRH
System had not been approved for use in pedicle surgery, these
warnings, taken alone, might not fully apprise a doctor of the risks
associated with the use of TSRH components.521

However, the court rejected this argument, pointing out
that the package insert had expressly stated that the TSRH
System’s components were intended for “attachment to the
sacrum or illium only.”522 In the court’s opinion, this language
was sufficient to inform an experienced doctor, such as the
plaintiff’s physician, that the TSRH screws had not been
approved for use in the pedicles.523 Accordingly, the court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the
failure-to-warn claim.524
3. Overpromotion as a Defense to Adequate Warnings
An otherwise satisfactory warning may be deemed to be
inadequate in a failure-to-warn case because the manufacturer
diluted the effect of the warning by “overpromotion.”525 For
example, assurances of safety by a drug company’s sales
representatives may negate FDA-approved warnings contained
in product labeling or the Physician’s Desk Reference.526
Courts appear to be split on the question of whether
a plaintiff can maintain an overpromotion claim when the
physician is aware of the risk that has been diluted by the
manufacturer’s overpromotion. Love v. Wolf527 and Formella v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp.528 represent differing views on this issue. Love
involved Cholormycetin, a wide-spectrum antibiotic manufactured by Parke-Davis529 that was widely prescribed for off-label
520
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522
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523
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524
Id.
525
David G. Owen et al., in 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 22:8, at 565-66 (3d ed. 2000).
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See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 284 (Pa. 1971), abrogated on
other grounds by Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Sept. 1980).
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38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1964).
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300 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
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uses during the 1970s.530 The plaintiff suffered severe aplastic
anemia after her doctor prescribed Cholormycetin to treat a
gum infection.531 At the time of the plaintiff’s injury, Cholormycetin’s package labeling warned of the risk of aplastic
anemia and other blood dyscrasias and cautioned that the drug
“should not be used indiscriminately or for minor infections.”532
The labeling also declared that adequate blood studies should
be made when Cholormycetin was prescribed for intermittent
or prolonged use.533
The plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Wolf, prescribed a total of
ninety-six Cholormycetin capsules during a relatively short
time to treat a gum infection and bronchitis, but failed to
perform any blood tests.534 At the trial, Dr. Wolf admitted that
these conditions were not sufficiently dangerous to fall within
the types of infections that Cholormycetin was intended
to treat.535 The jury apparently believed that the plaintiff’s
injuries were caused by Dr. Wolf’s off-label prescription of
the drug and found in favor of the plaintiff.536
On appeal, the court acknowledged that Parke-Davis
had warned about the risk of aplastic anemia and had urged
physicians to perform blood tests when Cholormycetin was
prescribed on a long-term basis.537 The court then turned to the
plaintiff’s argument that “such warnings must be deemed cancelled out if overpromotion through a vigorous sales program
persuaded doctors to disregard the warnings given.”538 The
court described how the Parke-Davis sales representatives
had encouraged off-label use of the drug by downplaying the
risk of aplastic anemia and falsely informing physicians that
the FDA had approved Cholormycetin “with no restrictions
on the number or range of diseases for which Cholormycetin
may be administered.”539 The court also observed that sales of
Cholormycetin were so numerous that it was apparent that
530

Christopher, supra note 13, at 249.
Love, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184. According to the court, aplastic anemia is a form
of blood dyscrasia, a “condition resulting from the depression or destruction of the
blood-forming elements in the bone marrow.” Id. at 185.
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the product was being prescribed for non-approved uses.540
Although the court reversed the verdict because of misconduct
on the part of the plaintiff’s lawyer, it refused to dismiss the
case against the drug company and instead ordered a new trial
on the overpromotion issue.541
However, at least one legal commentator has criticized
the court’s reasoning in Love.542 As Jonathan Grant pointed out,
notwithstanding the defendant’s promotional efforts, Dr. Wolf
was fully aware of the risks of long-term use of Cholormycetin,
yet chose to prescribe it anyway.543 In Dr. Wolf’s case, ParkeDavis’s overpromotion did not vitiate the warnings that it
provided on the drug’s labeling and, therefore, did not cause
the plaintiff’s injuries.544 In other words, Dr. Wolf’s negligence—if his prescription of Cholormycetin was negligent—was
the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury, not overpromotion of
the drug by Parke-Davis.545
A Michigan appellate court reached a different conclusion from that in Love in Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.546 The
plaintiff in that case developed aplastic anemia as a result of
taking Tandearil, a drug manufactured by the defendant.547 The
plaintiff brought suit, claiming that the drug company CibaGeigy overpromoted Tandearil and failed to adequately warn
her doctor about the risk of developing blood dyscrasia.548 At the
end of the trial, the lower court granted the Ciba-Geigy’s
motion for a directed verdict.549 On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court should not have excluded evidence of
Ciba-Geigy’s marketing plans.550 The appeals court observed
that the drug’s package insert had indicated that the drug
was contraindicated for patients, like the plaintiff, who were
allergic to penicillin.551 The package insert also had cautioned
against treating persons over age sixty with Tandearil for more
540
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than a week.552 In this case, the plaintiff was over sixty and her
doctor had treated her with the drug for lower back pain (an
off-label use) for more than six weeks.553 Finally, the package
insert had also recommended that blood tests be performed
weekly for elderly patients taking Tandearil. The plaintiff’s
doctor had not performed any blood tests until she developed
symptoms of aplastic anemia.554
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s doctor had been
aware that taking Tandearil for any length of time could cause
blood dyscrasia and had ignored this risk.555 According to the
court, even if the drug company was guilty of overpromoting
Tandearil, thereby diluting the effectiveness of the warnings,
overpromotion was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.556 Rather, the decision of the plaintiff’s doctor to adopt a
treatment regime that he knew would greatly increase the risk
of blood dyscrasia had been an independent cause—and the
sole proximate cause—of her injury.557 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of Ciba-Geigy.558
The court’s approach in Formella seems to represent the
prevailing view on the overpromotion issue in failure-to-warn
cases.559
In general, failure to warn is a potential source of
liability for drug manufacturers. In particular, manufacturers
who promote off-label uses may be held liable for failing to
warn doctors about the risks associated with a known off-label
use. Moreover, even when manufacturers do provide warnings,
a court may treat the warnings as inadequate if the manufacturer dilutes their effectiveness by overpromotion.
D.

The Duty to Test for Off-Label Related Risks

Manufacturers are unlikely to test off-label uses of their
products unless the FDA orders them to do so or they intend to
file a supplemental NDA because clinical trials and other forms
of testing can be expensive. Moreover, the failure to test for
risks associated with particular off-label uses ordinarily does
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
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not constitute negligence or make the product defective or
unreasonably dangerous. However, at least one court has
imposed liability for failure to test.560
In that decision—Medics Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Newman—the plaintiff was stricken with clear cell adenocarcinoma as a result of her mother’s ingestion of DES.561 The
plaintiff’s mother during her pregnancy had taken Diastyl, a
brand of DES marketed, but not manufactured, by the
defendant in order to prevent miscarriage.562 The defendant
claimed that it had not promoted Diastyl for use in preventing
miscarriages and that the drug’s package labeling had not
mentioned this as an indicated use.563 However, physicians had
been commonly prescribing DES for this purpose at the time
the plaintiff’s mother became pregnant.564 The plaintiff brought
suit, alleging that the defendant had failed to make a
reasonable effort to discover whether there were any risks
associated with using its product to prevent miscarriages.565
When the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
appealed.566
On appeal, the defendant argued that it could not be
held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries because it had not
recommended or marketed Diastyl for the prevention of
miscarriages.567 In response, however, the court declared that
“[t]he maker of an article for sale or use by others must use
reasonable care and skill in designing it . . . so that it is
reasonably safe for the purposes for which it intended, and for
other uses which are foreseeably probable . . . .”568 The court
distinguished between the duty to warn and the duty to test:
The defendant was not negligent in failing to inform the

560

See Medics Pharm. Corp. v. Newman, 378 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 488. DES is a synthetic estrogen that was originally developed to
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were at risk for miscarriage. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, About DES,
http://www.cdc.gov/des/consumers/about/effects_daughters.html. Unfortunately, many
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supra note 418, at 386-87.
562
Newman, 378 S.E.2d at 488.
563
Id.
564
Id.
565
Id. at 488-89.
566
Id. at 488.
567
Id.
568
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319
S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)).
561

2008]

“THERE’S DANGER HERE, CHERIE!”

1321

medical profession of the risk of cancer associated with Diastyl
because the risk had not been known at the time the plaintiff’s
mother ingested the drug.569 However, drug manufacturers are
required to use “reasonable care to provide a product which is
reasonably safe for those purposes for which it could
foreseeably be used.”570 In this case, the defendant’s duty of
reasonable care required it to try to discover whether there
were any dangers to the unborn fetus in using Diastyl for the
prevention of miscarriages.571
Although the general principle espoused in Newman
may be correct, the court’s application of the principle to the
particular facts of that case is problematic for three reasons.
First, the defendant was a distributor, not a drug manufacturer. Therefore, it would be highly unreasonable to expect the
company to conduct clinical research on a generic drug like
DES. Second, unlike most of the cases discussed in this Article,
the defendant in Newman did not promote off-label uses of
Diastyl. Apparently, the court was willing to impose a duty to
test for risks associated with off-label uses simply because the
defendant profited from the distribution of its product to
physicians who intended to prescribe it for off-label uses.
Finally, even if the defendant had engaged in drug testing, it is
doubtful that it could have discovered a correlation between
ingestion of the drug by pregnant women and subsequent
cancer in their unborn daughters. According to the court, the
plaintiff’s mother took Diastyl in 1963 or 1964, but the cancer
risk was not discovered by researchers until the early 1970s.572
There is no reason to think that the defendant would have
discovered this risk ten years sooner if it had engaged in
testing.
Plaintiffs have developed an impressive array of tort
liability theories in actions against pharmaceutical companies
that encourage off-label uses of their products. Although fraudon-the-FDA, negligence per se and fraudulent misrepresentation theories have not been very successful, some failure-towarn claims have succeeded. In addition, at least one court has
held a drug company liable for failing to test for off-label
related risks.

569
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V.

REGULATING THE PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES

A.

Sources of Danger

Bad things can happen to drug companies that promote
and market their products for off-label uses. There are a
number of sources of danger, as outlined above. The first source
is the FDCA itself. The promotion of off-label uses in violation
of the FDCA can constitute misbranding and lead to civil and
criminal liability.573 As the manufacturer of OxyContin
discovered, the fines and civil penalties can amount to millions
of dollars.574
RICO and FCA violations pose a second potential source
of risk to pharmaceutical companies that promote and market
their products for off-label uses.575 Cases brought under these
statutes usually involve fraudulent schemes to evade restrictions on compensation of off-label uses by Medicaid or other
government-sponsored health care programs. Although the
drug companies managed to avoid liability in Hamm and
Neurontin, the two RICO cases discussed earlier, RICO
remains a potential source of liability.576 For example, a group
of health insurance plans have brought a class action suit
against Pfizer, claiming that it engaged in a fraudulent scheme
to market Lipitor for off-label uses, which caused them to
pay billions of dollars for Lipitor prescriptions that violated
federal guidelines for treating cholesterol.577 In addition to
charging Pfizer with fraud and violation of state consumer
protection laws, the plaintiffs asserted claims under RICO.578
Finally, drug companies have been sued in qui tam actions
brought under the FCA.579 The defendants prevailed in two of
these reported cases—United States ex rel. Hess v. SanofiSynthelabo, Inc.580 and United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer
573
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Inc.581—but the manufacturer of Neurontin paid $430 million to
settle a FCA case,582 and a number of other FCA cases also
resulted in large settlements.583
Tort law is the third source of danger to drug manufacturers.584 Although the Supreme Court concluded that fraudon-the-FDA claims are impliedly preempted by the FDCA,585
numerous plaintiffs have tried to avoid the preemption bar by
invoking the doctrine of negligence per se instead.586 So far,
however, claims based on statutory violations have not been
well received by the courts.587 Fraudulent misrepresentation
claims have not fared well either because plaintiffs have had
difficulty proving reliance and causation.588 Failure-to-warn
claims have met with mixed results.589 Defendants have
prevailed in most of the reported cases,590 but plaintiffs have
won a few.591 Finally, at least one court has imposed liability on
a distributor of a prescription drug for failing to test for
possible side effects from a commonly prescribed off-label use of
the drug.592
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(1st Cir. 2007).
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Changing the Current Regulatory Policy

The current regulatory approach to off-label use of
drugs and medical devices is inconsistent and incoherent. On
one hand, the FDA tolerates and even approves of the
widespread prescription of drugs and medical devices for offlabel uses. At the same time, the FDA discourages pharmaceutical companies from disseminating information about offlabel uses to health care professionals.593 In addition, federal
health care programs often do not reimburse health care
providers for off-label therapies. This creates a serious
dilemma for drug companies. They have a strong financial
incentive to encourage off-label uses of their products by
directing promotional efforts at physicians and other health
care professionals. At the same time, drug companies that wish
to promote off-label uses of their products are often forced to
engage in conduct that exposes them to substantial civil and
criminal liability.594
The rationale for discouraging off-label uses is that
some of these uses may be dangerous or ineffective. Fen-phen
is perhaps the most famous example of an off-label prescription
drug use that posed significant safety risks.595 The drug
fenfluramine was originally approved by the FDA for shortterm use by obese patients. However, common off-label uses
included use in connection with another drug, phentermine;
use of the drug beyond the approved period; and use of the drug
by persons who were overweight but not obese.596 Unfortunately, long-term use of the fen-phen combination caused
heart valve damage to many patients.597 Other examples of
drugs that have caused injuries or were determined to be
ineffective after they were prescribed for off-label uses include
Letrozole, approved for the treatment of breast cancer but
prescribed as a fertility drug, and Actimmune, a drug approved
to treat two rare diseases but prescribed to treat idiopathic
pulmonary fibrosis.598 Letrozole caused birth defects, and
593
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Actimmune was eventually found to be ineffective for treating
pulmonary fibrosis.
The FDA’s ambivalent attitude regarding the promotion
of off-label uses by drug companies reflects the fact that the
agency is faced with two competing regulatory goals, and there
is no obvious way to reconcile or balance them. The competing
goals are the speedy introduction of new and innovative
treatments for disease and the need to assure the public that
prescription drugs and medical devices are effective and
reasonably safe. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
formulate a fully developed regulatory policy regarding offlabel use, it might be useful to examine a few alternatives to
the present policy.
We start with the assumption that a complete ban on
the promotion of off-label uses would have an adverse effect on
public health because it would inhibit the dissemination of
information about innovative medical treatments.599 As long as
the FDA allows physicians to prescribe drugs and medical
devices for unapproved uses, it makes no sense for the agency
to limit access to information about such uses. Therefore, the
FDA should revise its current policy to permit drug companies
to promote off-label uses of their products in the same manner
as they promote approved uses. In order to reduce the risks of
off-label use, the FDA should monitor promotional material for
accuracy and should require researchers who publish their
findings in scientific journals or speak at medical educational
programs to disclose any financial interest they may have in
the product.600 At the same time, the FDA should be able to
require a drug company to warn doctors when it becomes
aware of a risk associated with an off-label use,601 and if the
risk is significant, the agency should have the power to require
the manufacturer to prepare a supplemental NDA if it wishes
to continue promoting a particular off-label use. To be sure, if
drug manufacturers are allowed to freely promote off-label uses
of their products, they will have less incentive to undertake
the time-consuming and expensive process of seeking FDA
approval. However, as we have seen, as long as Medicare and
599
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Medicaid programs do not reimburse health care providers
for off-label uses, drug manufacturers will still have some
incentive to seek FDA approval for uses that are currently offlabel.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Off-label uses of prescription drugs and medical devices
are common and widely accepted within the medical
profession.602 Unfortunately, the FDA restricts the ability of
drug manufacturers to promote off-label uses of their products.
In addition, government health insurance programs often do
not reimburse health care providers for off-label uses of
pharmaceutical products. Drug companies who act improperly
risk liability for violating the FDCA, RICO, or the FCA. Drug
manufacturers may also be subject to tort liability based on
theories of negligence per se, fraudulent misrepresentation,
failure to warn, and failure to test for risks associated with offlabel uses. All of this not only subjects drug companies to
substantial financial risks, but also discourages them from
providing physicians with useful information about new and
effective treatments.
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